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ABSTRACT
The Defense Acquisition System acquires weapon systems and other items used
by armed forces to meet threats to national security in a rapidly changing internal and
external environment. Over the last decade, many improvements have been implemented
in the Defense Acquisition System. Some have been extremely effective, and others less
effective, but the dynamic environment and desire to be perfect lead to continuous
change.
This thesis analysis the Defense Acquisition System and its challenges from a
program manager's perspective and presents a snapshot of the current system by means
of a comprehensive review of the system and a survey of acquisition managers.
The major conclusion drawn from this research is that the uncertainty of the
environment and the unstable/lack of funding are the main sources of the challenges.
Rigid controls placed on all the resources are detracting the program manager from
his/her primary function of managing the program. Therefore, effective communication
and cooperation between interested parties and an increased empowerment of the PM will
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The purpose of this research paper is to study the Defense Acquisition System and
its challenges from a program management perspective and present a snapshot of the
current system. This is accomplished through a comprehensive Defense Acquisition
System review, and a survey of acquisition professionals.
The Defense Acquisition System review will be examined in three parts: 1) the
Department of Defense (DoD) Organization, 2) the Defense Acquisition Management
Process, 3) the Resource Allocation Process (RAP) and National Security. Then efforts
to improve the system will be addressed to see what has been done and what might be
done in the future.
Additionally, a survey, which was conducted among Program Managers (PM),
and other acquisition managers one level up and down from the PM, will examine current
view points and attitudes of acquisition professionals with regard to the Defense
Acquisition System challenges.
B. BACKGROUND
The Defense Acquisition System started almost 200 years ago and since World
War II in 1946 has been rapidly shaped into the current system. Since that time, it has
been the most intricate and one of the largest enterprises in the world. The system has
many stake holders which makes it a challenge to manage without the effective
integration of all players' objectives in the system.
Defense Acquisition, has a meaning more than it is written in the dictionary. It
includes "... the entire process used to identify mission needs as well as the process
whereby all equipment, facilities and services are planned and designed within DoD. The
system entails acquisitions, determining and prioritizing resource requirements, directing
and controlling the process, contracting, and reporting to the Congress [Ref l:p. V-3]."
For decades, the system was under close intense scrutiny by the U.S. public
because of its large share of the Federal budget (15-30 percent) and its importance to
National Security. Because of the declining defense budget, the cost of the weapon
systems and their cycle time has become very important. To achieve a reduced
acquisition cycle time, Acquisition Reforms have been continually implemented.
According to an ever-changing environment and different priorities among cost,
schedule, and performance, management practices and various differing acquisition
paradigms have evolved. Before or during war time, mostly the performance and cycle
time have the first priorities. Other times, cost becomes the most important criteria. Also
technology and technology related support systems make significant management
changes possible. In addition, changing threat affects the priorities and intensity of the
change in management. With every iteration, there appeared to be something missing in
the system. Each time a new requirement or need emerged, the system has tried to change
to adapt. This kind of reactive approach tends to mask the real cause behind the
symptoms.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What is the Defense Acquisition System and what are the challenges from the
Program Manager's point of view?
2. Secondary Research Questions
a. What is the relationship between Resource Allocation Process (RAP) and
National Security objectives?
b. What are the impacts of improvement efforts on the Defense Acquisition
System?
D. SCOPE
This research will address the current Defense Acquisition System and challenges
from the Program Managers point of view. It will include the organizational structure,
management process, and key players' interactions and influences on the management
process. By providing the "big picture" of the system, and the current snapshot of the PM
with his/her perception on these issues with a survey, Defense Acquisition System will be
examined thoroughly.
E. METHODOLOGY
The first objective of the this research paper is to provide an overview of the
current Defense Acquisition System. This will be accomplished through a literature
review of sources including, but not limited to, the following:
• Unclassified DoD publications
• Published academic research papers
• References, publications and electronic media available at the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) library
• Internet websites and homepages (DoD, commercial, and academic)
• Interviews with systems management faculty at NPS.
The next objective is to perform a survey among Defense Acquisition Managers
to identify their current challenges and get their perspective regarding the causes of the
deficiencies (if any) in the system. Relationships and interactions of the players and their
influences on the Defense Acquisition Management Process will be discussed.
F. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II (The Defense Acquisition Management System) provides an overview
of the current Defense Acquisition System and DoD organization structure. Chapter II
also provides background information on the relationships between the players of the
Defense Acquisition System.
Chapter III (The Resource Allocation Process, Budget, and National Security)
introduces the Resource Allocation Process which is the backbone of the Defense
Acquisition System. The chapter then examines National Security objectives for the
following 10-20 years based on the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The
chapter concludes with the discussion of the effects of the QDR on Defense Acquisition
Management.
Chapter IV (Acquisition Reform) provides background information on
Acquisition Reforms and some important current efforts to improve the Defense
Acquisition System.
Chapter V (The Survey) provides the survey findings.
Chapter VI (Analysis) provides an in-depth analysis of the survey findings, with
their relationship to the thesis scope and background.
Chapter VII (Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations) summarizes the
findings of the research, answers the research questions, and presents recommendations
for further research and study.
G. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY
The primary benefit of this study will be the documentation of the Defense
Acquisition System, the impacts of past and current reforms, and the identification of
needed reforms. The current organization, players, interactions of the players, and efforts
to improve the system in recent years will give the reader a complete picture of the
system. The survey conducted with managers from three levels of the Defense
Acquisition Management will provide insight from PM's point of view about problems
and prospective solutions. An additional benefit of the study is to provide
recommendations for further research of the Acquisition Reforms and reorganization of
the system.
II. BACKGROUND DEFENSE ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
The meaning of the Acquisition in Defense systems is far away from its definition
as a simple word in the dictionary. It defines a complex, unique and ever-changing living
organism. It includes the Congress, Executive branch, Industry and the interactions
within each other.
The following is the basic definition given by DSMC:
A single uniform system whereby all equipment, facilities, and services
are planned, developed, acquired, maintained and disposed of the
Department of Defense (DoD). The system includes policies and practices
that govern acquisition, identifying and prioritizing resource requirements,
directing and controlling the process, contracting, and reporting to
Congress. [Ref 2:p. 1]
The Defense Acquisition System acquires weapon systems and other items used
by the armed forces to meet threats to national 'security. In this regard, it maybe
considered as an extension of National Security Policy. The Department of Defense
conduct its mission of deterring, and/or denying war by means of weapon "systems" with
other tools it is using.
"The very first major weapon acquisition of the U.S. Government started with an
authorization for the procurement of the six large frigates by the U.S. War Department in
1794 [Ref l:p. V-5]." But acquisition problems started with the first acquisition attempt,
and only three of the six frigates were built due to schedule slippage and cost overruns.
The professional acquisition system started after World war II in 1946, and has been
shaped by many factors through today. By its nature, there is no final system, but an ever-
evolving one.
"Defense Acquisition" starts with defining requirements, goes through analyzing
alternatives, obtaining/acquiring a new system, deployment and support of the new
system, and ends with disposal of the system.
-*
Figure 2-1, Major Players of the Defense Acquisition System, from [Ref 3]
B. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND
INDUSTRY IN DEFENSE ACQUISITION
Major elements of the Defense Acquisition System are the Executive Branch of
the Federal Government, the Congress and industry. Each of these participants, in terms
of perspectives, method of operation and objectives is discussed briefly below.
1. Executive Branch:
Principal players within the Executive Branch include the President, the
Department of Defense (DoD), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the
Department of State and the National Security Council (NSC). [Ref 2:p. 2]
Perspective:
• Formulate, direct, and execute national security policy




• Contract with industry
• Command and control of unified and specified commands through the Joint
Chief of Staff
• Negotiate with Congress
• Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) USD(A&T)
decides on major defense acquisition programs
Objectives:
• Satisfy national security needs and objectives
• Maintain a balanced force structure
• Field weapon systems to defeat the threat
• Eliminate fraud, waste and abuse in acquisition
2. Legislative Branch:
The Legislative Branch (Congress) includes the "Defense Committees":
the Senate and House Armed Services Committees (the Authorization Committees) and
the Defense Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriation Committees; the
Senate and House Budget Committees; other committees having legislative oversight of
defense activities; individual members of Congress; the Congressional Budget Office and
the General Accounting Office (GAO). [Ref 2:p. 2]
Perspective:




Want to be reelected
Patriotic








Balance defense and social needs




Control fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement
3. Industry:
The defense industry (contractors) includes large and small organizations
providing goods and services to DoD. [Ref 2:p. 3]
Perspective:















In this complex and adverse environment, each party has been trying to reach its
own objective. With the Acquisition Reform, the Government has tried to establish a
"Win-Win" situation. The ultimate goal is to satisfy all the players at an optimum point.
Otherwise, at least one party will "lose" in the long term. Since Defense Acquisition
relies on long-term relationships, Acquisition Reform has to be accepted by all parties.
DEFENSE ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS
1. Background
The backbone of the current Defense Acquisition Management Organization was
basically formed after the Packard Commission, initiated by Executive Order 12526.
Former Secretary of Defense David Packard included almost all acquisition players in his
Defense Acquisition Organization process review. Reporting to the President in mid-
1986, the Commission recommended the creation of a single position responsible for
acquisition (the USD (A&T)) and establishment of a streamlined reporting chain from the
program manager to the acquisition decision authority within DoD. President Reagan
approved the Packard Commission recommendations and he directed their
implementation via National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219 in 1986. [Ref 2:p.
11]
President Bush initiated a follow-on assessment of defense acquisition
management in 1989 via the National Security Review (NSR). With this second
assessment, Packard Commission findings were reiterated. As a result, DoDD 5000.1,
DoDI 5000.2 and DoD 5000.2-M were issued in February 1991. In March 1996, 5000
Series DoD Directives were revised.
2. Four-tier System
The U.S. Defense Management Organization has a complex structure. In the
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) organization, the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition and Technology) (USD (A&T)) is the main responsible body for all DoD
Acquisition Management Processes. Basically, it is a four-tier system (Figure 2-2)























• Establishes DoD policy for acquisition/
procurement/ research & development
• Supervises acquisition system
• Provides DoD program oversight
• Approves program baseline
ASSISTANT SECRETARY/ EQUIVALENT
• Supervises component acquisition process
• Establishes component acquisition policy
• Approves program baseline
FLAG OFFICER/SES CIVILIAN
• Oversees program execution
• Reports only to CAE for program matters
• Approves program baseline
CAPT - COL/LT COL - CDR/CIV
• Manages/executes program
• Reports only to PEO for program matters
• Develops program baseline
Figure 2-2, The "four-tier" system, from (Ref 3]
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This structure provides a chain of authority running from the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition (USD (A)) through full-time Component Acquisition Executives
(CAEs) and full time Program Executive Officers (PEOs) to the individual program
managers of Major Defense Acquisition Programs. The services have chosen somewhat
different approaches for implementing this policy. [Ref 2:p. 12]
a. Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE)
USD (A&T) serves as Defense Acquisition Executive. For acquisition
matters, USD (A&T) takes precedence over the Secretaries and ranks number three
within DoD. Details on responsibilities and authorities ofUSD (A&T) will be given later
in this chapter.
b. Component Acquisition Executive (CAE)
A single official within a DoD Component who is responsible for all
acquisition functions within that Component. This includes Service Acquisition
Executives for the Military Departments and Acquisition Executives in other DoD
Components who have overall acquisition management responsibilities [Ref 4]. Principal
Staff Assistants, the Under Secretaries of Defense, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense,
the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense, the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, the Assistants to
the Secretary of Defense, and the OSD Directors or equivalents who report directly to the
Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense. [Ref 5]
c. Program Executive Officer (PEO)
A Program Executive Officer (PEO) is military or civilian official who has
primary responsibility for directing several acquisition category I programs and for
assigned acquisition category II, III, and IV programs. A PEO has no other command or
staff responsibilities within the Component, and only reports to and receives guidance
and direction from the DoD Component Acquisition Executive. [Ref 4]
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d. Program Manager (PM)
A Program Manager (PM) is "military or civilian official who is
responsible for managing an acquisition program [Ref 4]." With respect to a major or
significant non-major defense acquisition program, the term "program manager" means
the member of an Acquisition Corps responsible for managing the program, regardless of
the title given the member. [Ref 6]
e. Deputy Program Manager
The person who has continuing authority to act on behalf of the PM in his
or her absence is the Deputy Program Manger (DPM).
3. Major Players in DoD
Major players and sub-organizations described in Defense Organizations and
Functions Guidebook are described as given below:
a. Acquisition Organization
An organization, including its subordinate elements, whose mission
includes planning, managing and/or executing acquisition programs which are governed
by DoD Directive 5000.1, DoD Instruction 5000.2 and related issuance. Specifically:
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition); Army Materiel Command; Army
Information Systems Command; Army Strategic Defense Command; Army Acquisition
Executive; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and
Acquisition); Naval Sea Systems Command; Naval Air Systems Command; Naval
Supply Systems Command; Naval Facilities Engineering Command; Office of the Chief
of Naval Research; Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command; Navy Strategic
Systems Program Office; Navy Program Executive Officer/Direct Reporting Program
Manager Organization; Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition
Command; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition); Air Force
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Figure 2-4, The Secretary of Defense, from [Ref 7J
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b. The Secretary ofDefense
The Secretary of Defense is the principal defense policy advisor to the
President and is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy and policy
related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the DoD, and for the execution of
approved policy. Under the direction of the President, the Secretary exercises authority,
direction, and control over the Department of Defense. [Ref 7]
c. Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (Figure 2-4) is the principal
staff element used by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense to exercise
authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense. The mission of OSD as
an organizational entity, in coordination with other elements of DoD, is as follows:
• Develop and promulgate policies in support of United States national security
objectives.
• Provide oversight to assure the effective allocation and efficient management
of resources consistent with Secretary of Defense approved plans and
programs.
• Develop appropriate evaluation mechanisms to provide effective supervision
of policy implementation and program execution at all levels of the
Department.
• Provide the focal point for departmental participation in the United States
security community and other Government activities.
In addition, each OSD principal staff official, in his/her respective areas of
functional assignment, is responsible for performing the following:
• Conduct analyses, develop policies, provide advice, make recommendations,
and issue guidance on Defense plans and programs.
• Develop systems and standards for the administration and management of
approved plans and programs.
15
• Initiate programs, actions, and taskings to ensure adherence to DoD policies
and national security objectives, and to ensure that programs are designed to
accommodate operational requirements.
• Review and evaluate programs for carrying out approved policies and
standards.
• Inform appropriate organizations and personnel of new and significant trends
or initiatives in assigned areas of functional responsibilities.
• Review proposed resource programs, formulate budget estimates, recommend
resource allocations, and monitor the implementation of approved programs.
• Participate in those planning, programming, and budgeting activities, which
relate to assigned areas of functional responsibilities.
• Review and evaluate recommendations on requirements and priorities.
• Promote coordination, cooperation, and mutual understanding within the
Department of Defense and between DoD and other Federal agencies and the
civilian community.
• Serve on boards, committees, and other groups pertaining to assigned
functional areas, and represent the Secretary of Defense on matters outside the
Department of Defense.
• Develop information and data, prepare reports, and/or testimony for
presentations to Congressional Committees or in response to congressional
inquiries.
• Represent the DoD with Congressional Committees or individual Members of
the Congress.
• Perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may from time to time
prescribe.
d. The Deputy Secretary ofDefense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense is delegated full power and authority to
act for the Secretary of Defense and to exercise the powers of the Secretary on any and
all matters for which the Secretary is authorized to act pursuant to law. [Ref 7]
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e. Under Secretary ofDefense (Policy) USD (P)) (DoD Directive
5111.1)
Under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the USD (P) is the
principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for
all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy and the
integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.
In the exercise of this responsibility, the USD (P) shall:
• Represent the DoD, as directed, in matters involving the National Security
Council (NSC), Department of State (DoS), and other Departments, Agencies,
and interagency groups with responsibilities for national security policy.
• Serve as a member of the NSC Deputies Committee; serve as a member of the
Deputies Committee for Crisis Management; and advise the Secretary of
Defense on crisis prevention and management, including contingency
planning for major areas of concern.
• Develop policy for defense-related international negotiations and represent the
DoD in those negotiations unless otherwise directed.
• Develop and coordinate DoD policy and positions for international
negotiations on arms control implementation and/or compliance issues.
• Develop policy on the conduct of alliances and defense relationships with
foreign governments, their military establishments, and international
organizations; integrate and oversee plans and programs undertaken in
conjunction with those alliances and defense relationships.
• Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of international security
strategy and policy; political-military policy on issues of DoD interest that
relate to foreign governments and their defense establishments, to include
arrangements for United States military facilities, access and operating rights,
and status of forces; and policy on all matters relating to prisoners of war and
missing in action.
• Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of policy and plans for
defense security assistance.
17
Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of policy to reduce and
counter the threat to the United States, its forces, and allies of weapons of
mass destruction and other militarily significant technologies and force
capabilities, to include counter-proliferation policy, arms control policy, and
security policy.
Provide oversight of all DoD activities related to international technology
transfer; develop, coordinate, and provide policy direction and overall
management for the DoD Technology Security Program and policy related to
international technology transfer, to include export controls, dual-use and
munitions licensing, arms cooperation programs, and support for enforcement
and intelligence systems.
Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of strategy and policy
for strategic and theater nuclear offensive forces, strategic and defensive
forces, and space systems; and review and evaluate plans, programs, and
systems requirements for such forces and systems to assure consistency with
the strategy and policy.
Assist the Secretary of Defense in development of national security and
defense strategy; advise on the resources and forces necessary to implement
that strategy, to include serving as the principal advisor for the planning phase
of the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and for
monitoring the degree to which the DoD program and budget underwrite the
strategy; and assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy
guidance for the preparation and review of operational and contingency plans,
including those for nuclear and conventional forces, and in reviewing such
plans.
Develop policy guidance, provide overall supervision, and provide oversight
of planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of special operations
activities, including civil affairs and psychological operations, and of low-
intensity conflict activities, including counter terrorism, support to insurgency,
and contingency operations.
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• Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of policy for the defense
and military aspects of the promotion of constitutional democracy and respect
for human rights, United States participation in peace operations, and the
provision of humanitarian assistance.
• Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of drug control policy,
including planning, programming, and budgeting for the DoD counter-drug
mission.
• Provide mid- and long-range policy planning on strategic security matters and
emerging national security issues; develop and oversee the implementation of
a comprehensive strategy toward Russia, Ukraine, and other newly
independent states of Eurasia; plan and conduct net assessments and policy
research activities and programs.
• Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of policy for
international security countermeasures activities of the Department of
Defense; administer for the Department of Defense the National Disclosure
Policy, the Foreign Disclosure and Technical Information System, the Foreign
Visits System, and the U.S. Visitor International Technology System.
• As the U.S. Security Authority for North Atlantic Treaty Organization, serve
as the primary focal point for staff coordination on these matters both internal
and external to the Department of Defense.
• Develop policy and provide oversight for emergency planning and
preparedness, crisis management, defense mobilization in emergency
situations, military support to civil authorities, civil defense, and continuity of
operations and government. Develop policy and coordinate DoD participation
in, and exercise staff supervision over, special activities, special access
programs, sensitive support to non-DoD agencies, and the joint worldwide
reconnaissance schedule.
The above functions are carried out through the following key OSD
personnel:
• Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (DoDD 5111.3)
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• Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (DoDD
5111.7)
• Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy) (DoDD 5111.5)
• Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Requirements) (DoDD 5111.8)
• Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict) (DoDD 51 11.10)
• Defense Advisor for U. S. Mission NATO
© Director of Net Assessment (DoDD 5111.9)
In addition, the USD (P) exercises authority, direction, and control over
the following:
• Defense Security Assistance Agency (DoDD 5105.38 - under revision),
through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
• Defense Technology Security Administration (DoDD 5105.51), through the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy)
• Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office (DoDD 5105.38), through
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
/ Under Secretary ofDefense (Personnel and Readiness)
(USD(P&R)) (DoD Directive 5124.2)
Under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the USD (P&R) is the
principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for
Total Force management as it relates to readiness; National Guard and Reserve
component affairs; health affairs; training; and personnel requirements and management,
including equal opportunity, morale, welfare, and quality of life matters. In the exercise
of this responsibility, the USD (P&R) shall:
• Develop policies, plans, and programs for:
S Total Force personnel and their allocation among DoD Components and
between the Active and Reserve components to ensure efficient and
effective support of wartime and peacetime operations, contingency
planning, and preparedness.
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S Reserve component affairs to promote the effective integration of Reserve
component capabilities into a cohesive Total Force.
S Health and medical affairs sufficient to provide, and maintain readiness to
provide, medical services and support to members of the Armed Forces
during military operations, and to provide medical services and support to
members of the Armed Forces, their dependents, and others entitled to
DoD medical care.
S Recruitment, training, equal opportunity, compensation, recognition,
discipline, and separation of all DoD personnel, to include both military
(Active, Reserve, and retired) and civilian.
•S The quality of life of DoD personnel and their dependents, including
family support, allowances transition assistance, community services, and
dependent education.
S DoD moral, welfare, and recreation programs and supporting non-
appropriated fund revenue-generating programs including commissaries
and exchanges.
S Interagency and intergovernmental activities, special projects, or external
requests that create a demand for DoD personnel resources.
Serve as OSD focal point for readiness issues; develop policies, management
structures, and administrative processes to ensure forces have sufficient
readiness to execute the National Military Strategy; oversee Total Force
personnel and medical readiness; and coordinate with other Principal Staff
Assistants and cognizant officials in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and in the Services on other aspects of readiness.
Analyze the Total Force structure as related to quantitative and qualitative
military and civilian personnel requirements, utilization, readiness and
support.
Administer and implement controls on military and civilian personnel
strengths for Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and other DoD
Components.
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Review and evaluate the requirements of the Defense Acquisition Board's
major defense acquisition programs and proposed weapon systems for
personnel, training, and readiness implications, and the implications of
weapon systems maintainability for qualitative and quantitative personnel
requirements and for readiness.
Formulate policy for and ensure coordination of DoD Noncombatant
Evacuation Operations (NEO).
Participate in those planning, programming, and budgeting activities that
relate to assigned areas of responsibility.
Serve on boards, committees, and other groups pertaining to assigned
functional areas and represent the Secretary of Defense on personnel,
readiness, Reserve component, health, and compensation matters outside of
the Department.
The above functions are carried out through the following key OSD
personnel:
• Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy) (DoDD 5124.5)
• Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (DoDD 5136.1)
• Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (DoDD 5125.1)
In addition, the USD(P&R) exercises authority, direction, and control over
the following:
• Defense Commissary Agency (DoDD. 5105.55), through the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy)
• Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDD 1342.6), through the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy)
• DoD Civilian Personnel Management Service (DoDD 5124.4), through the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy)
• Defense Medical Programs Activity (DoDD 5136.1), through the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
• Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
(DoDD 5105.46), through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
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• Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, through the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), pursuant to the authority vested in the
Secretary of Defense by Chapter 104 of 10 U.S.C., except that the authority to
appoint the President, USUHS, is reserved to the Secretary of Defense (DoDD
5105.45)
• Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute
• Defense Manpower Data Center
g. DoD Field Activities
The DoD Field Activities (Figure 2-4) are established by the Secretary of
Defense, under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, to perform selected
support and service functions of a more limited scope than Defense Agencies.
Organization and Functions of specific DoD Field Activities are:
(1) The Inspector General. The Inspector General of the
Department of Defense (DoD Directive 5106.1), under the provisions set forth by Public
Law 95-452, serves as an objective official in the Department of Defense who is
responsible for conducting, supervising, monitoring, and initiating audits, investigations,
and inspections relating to programs and operations of the Department of Defense. The
Inspector General provides leadership and coordination and recommends policies for
activities designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the
administration of, and to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in, such programs and
operations. The Inspector General is also responsible for keeping the Secretary of
Defense and the Congress fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies
relating to the administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for, and
progress of, corrective action. [Ref 7]
(2) The Joint Chief of Staff and Joint Staff. The Joint Chief of
Staff (JCS) and Joint Staff (DoDN Directive 5100.1). The Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, consists of the Chairman; the Vice
Chairman, JCS; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief
of Staff, U.S. Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and supported,
subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, by the Joint Staff,
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constitute the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the
JCS is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. The Chiefs of Service are the senior military officers of their
respective Services and are responsible for keeping the Secretaries of the Military
Departments fully informed on matters considered or acted upon by the JCS, and are
military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of
Defense. The Vice-Chairman of the JCS performs such duties as may be prescribed by
the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in
the Office of the Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice-
Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is
appointed or the absence or disability ceases.
(3) Military Departments. The Military Departments (DoD
Directive 5100.1) (Figure 2-5) are the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
(the Marine Corps is a part of the Department of the Navy). Each Military Department is
separately organized under its own Secretary and functions under the authority, direction,
and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Military Departments are responsible for
organizing, training, supplying, and equipping forces for assignment to Unified
Combatant Commands.
(4) Unified Combatant Commands. The Unified Combatant
Commands (DoD Directive 5 1 00. 1 ) are responsible to the President and the Secretary of
Defense for accomplishing the military missions assigned to them. Commanders of the
Unified Combatant Commands exercise command authority over forces assigned to them
as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The operational chain of command runs from the
President to the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the Unified Combatant
Commands. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions within the chain of
command by transmitting to the Commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands the
orders of the President or the Secretary of Defense. Unified Combatant Commands
include the European Command, Pacific Command, Atlantic Command, Southern
Command, Special Operations Command, Strategic Command, Central Command,
Transportation Command, and Space Command. [Ref 7]
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h. Under Secretary ofDefense (Acquisition and Technology)
(USD(A&T)) (DoD Directive 5134.1)
Under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the USD (A&T) is the
principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for
all matters relating to the DoD Acquisition System; research and development; advanced
technology; test and evaluation; production; logistics; military construction; procurement;
economic security; and atomic energy. In the exercise of this responsibility, the USD
(A&T) shall:
• Serve as the Defense Acquisition Executive with full responsibility for
supervising the performance of the DoD Acquisition System.
• Chair the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB).
• Serve as the DoD Procurement Executive.
• Chair the DoD Ethics Council.
• Serve as the United States representative at the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Conference of National Armaments Directors and other
multinational forums of armaments directors.
• Establish and publish policies and procedures governing the operations of the
DoD Acquisition System and the administrative oversight of defense
contractors.
• Prescribe the developmental testing and evaluation program (which excludes
those' statutory test and evaluation responsibilities assigned to the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, including establishing and ensuring
implementation of policies and program plans, including funding, for ranges
and test facilities and also be responsible for the acquisition- related functions
of weapons programs, including control of the elements of the OSD
performing the acquisition-related functions of strategic and theater nuclear
forces programs and tactical warfare programs.
• Prescribe policies, in coordination with the IG, DoD, and the Under Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller), to ensure that audit and oversight of contractor
activities are coordinated and carried out in a manner to prevent duplication
25
by different elements of the DoD. The exercise of this responsibility shall not
affect the authority of the IG, DoD, under the Inspector General Act of 1978.
• Coordinate research and development programs DoD-wide to eliminate
duplication of effort and ensure that available resources are used to maximum
advantage.
• Establish policies and programs that strengthen DoD Component technology
development programs, encourage technical competition and technology-
driven prototyping that promise increased military capabilities, and exploit the
cost-reduction potential of innovative or commercially developed
technologies.
• Develop acquisition plans, strategies, guidance, and assessments, including
affordability assessments and investment area analyses, in support of the
acquisition Milestone review and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS) processes.
• Designate major defense acquisition programs as either DAB or Component
programs, sign congressional certifications and reports to include Milestone
authorization breaches, administer the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) and
Unit Cost Report (UCR) systems.
• Develop, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(USD (P)), agreements with friendly and Allied Nations relating to acquisition
matters.
• Establish policies relating to the capabil-ity of U.S. defense industry to meet
DoD needs.
• Establish policies and procedures, in coordination with the Under Secretary of
Defense.
• Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)), for the effective management of the
acquisition workforce within the Department of Defense, including accession,
education, training, and career development.
• Establish and manage the cooperative research and development program.
The above functions are carried out with the support of the following key
OSD personnel:
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• The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) (DoDD 5134.6)
• The Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DoDD 5 1 34.3)
• The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs)(DoDD 5134.8)
• The Director of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (DoDD
5134.4)
• The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform)
• The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced Technology) .
• The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Security)
• The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and Installations)
• The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (International and Commercial
Programs)
• The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics)
• The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Space)
In addition, the USD (A&T) exercises authority, direction, and control
over the following:
• Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (DoDD 5134.9)
• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DoDD 5134.10), through the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering
• Defense Logistics Agency (DoDD 5 1 05.22)
• Defense Special Weapons Agency (DoDD 5105.31), through the Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense
Programs)
• On-Site Inspection Agency (DoDD TS-5 134.2), through the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense
Programs)
• Office of Economic Adjustment (DoDD 3030.1), through the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and Installations)
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• Defense Acquisition University (DoDD 5000.57), through the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform)
L Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) (DoD
Directive 5141.2)
Under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the DOT&E is the
principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on
OT&E in the DoD and the principal OT&E official within the senior management of the
DoD. The DOT&E is responsible for the following functional areas:
• Prescribe policies and procedures for the conduct of OT&E within the
Department of Defense. Provide advice and make recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense, and issue guidance to, and consult with, the heads of the
DoD Components with respect to OT&E in the DoD in general, and with
respect to specific OT&E to be conducted in connection with a major defense
acquisition program.
• Designate selected special interest weapons, equipment, or munitions as major
defense acquisition programs.
• Develop systems and standards for the administration and management of
approved OT&E plans for major defense acquisition programs.
• Monitor and review all OT&E in the DoD to ensure adherence to approved
policies and standards.
• Analyze the results of OT&E conducted for each major defense acquisition
program and submit a report to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), and to the Committees on Armed
Services and Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives that
addresses (a) the adequacy of the test and evaluation performed and (b)
whether the results confirm the combat effectiveness and suitability of the
items tested.
• Coordinate operational testing conducted jointly by more than one DoD
Component.
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• Review and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on all
budgetary and financial matters relating to OT&E, including operational test
facilities and equipment.
• Initiate plans, programs, actions, and tasking to ensure that OT&E for major
defense acquisition programs is designed to evaluate the operational
effectiveness and suitability of U.S. military weapon systems and equipment.
• Review and report to the Secretary of Defense on the adequacy of operational
test planning, priorities, support resources, execution, evaluation, and
reporting for major defense acquisition programs while avoiding unnecessary
duplication.
j. Selected Defense Agencies
The Defense Agencies (Figure 2-3), authorized by the Secretary of
Defense pursuant to the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, perform selected
support and service functions on a Department-wide basis; Defense Agencies that are
assigned wartime support missions are designated as Combat Support Agencies.
Organization and Functions of specific Defense Agencies
(1) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (DoD Directive 5105.22).
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), is a Combat Support Agency of the Department of
Defense (DoD) under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition and Technology). DLA provides worldwide logistics support for
the missions of the Military Departments and the Unified Combatant Commands under
conditions of peace and war. It also provides logistics support to other DoD Components
and certain Federal agencies, foreign governments, international organizations, and others
as authorized. Provides materiel commodities and items of supply that have been
determined, through the application of approved criteria, to be appropriate for integrated
management by DLA on behalf of all DoD Components, Or that have been otherwise
specifically assigned by appropriate authority. Furnishes logistics services directly
associated with the supply management function and other support services including
scientific and technical information, federal cataloging, industrial plant equipment,
reutilization and marketing and systems analysis, design, procedural development and
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maintenance for supply and service systems, industrial plant equipment storage and
issuance, DLA logistics systems development, and the National Defense Stockpile
Program. Maintains a wholesale distribution system for assigned items. Provides contract
administration service in support of the Military Departments, other DoD Components,
Federal civil agencies and, when authorized, to foreign governments and others.
(2) Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) (DoD
Directive 5134.10). The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), under
the authority, direction, and control of the Director for Defense Research and
Engineering, serves as the central research and development organization of the DoD
with a primary responsibility to maintain U.S. technological superiority over potential
adversaries. The DARPA pursues imaginative and innovative research and development
projects offering significant military utility; manages and directs the conduct of basic and
applied research and development that exploits scientific breakthroughs and demonstrates
the feasibility of revolutionary approaches for improved cost and performance of
advanced technology; and, stimulates a greater emphasis on prototyping in defense
systems by conducting prototype projects that embody technology that might be
incorporated in joint programs, programs in support of deployed U.S. Forces (including
the Unified Combatant Commands), or selected Military Department programs, and on
request, assist the Military Departments in their own prototyping programs.
k. Under Secretary ofDefense (Comptroller) (USD(Q) (DoD
Directive 5118.3)
Under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the USD(C) is the
principal advisor and assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for
budgetary and fiscal matters (including financial management, accounting policy and
systems, budget formulation and execution, and contract audit administration and
organization), DoD program analysis and evaluation, and general management
improvement programs. In addition, the USD(C) is the Chief Financial Officer of the
Department of Defense. In the exercise of this responsibility, the USD(C) shall:
• Administer the planning, programming, and budgeting system of the DoD.
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• Supervise and direct the formulation and presentation of Defense budgets, the
interactions with the Congress on budgetary and fiscal matters, and the
execution and control of approved budgets; and maintain effective control and
accountability over the use of all financial resources of the DoD.
• Establish and supervise the execution of uniform DoD policies, principles, and
procedures (including terminology and classifications, as necessary) for:
•S Budget formulation and execution; financial management programs and
systems;
•S Accounting and disbursing systems; cash and credit management; debt
collection;
•S Financial progress and statistical reporting; and technical, organizational,
and administrative matters related to contract audit.
•S Relationships with financial institutions, including those operating on
DoD installations in the United States and overseas.
S International financial matters, including the adequacy of international
financial agreements.
•S Education, training, and career development of comptroller and financial
management personnel.
•S Prices for transactions involving the provision of goods and services by
DoD Components, including sales to foreign governments.
• Access to DoD budgetary material and other records by the General
Accounting Office (GAO).
• Provide for the design, development, and installation of management
improvement programs and systems throughout the DoD by:
•S Improving general management practices within the Department by
analyzing current practices, identifying improvements that will result in
management efficiencies, measuring cost savings, and implementing
changes.
S Developing and overseeing implementation of total cost per output
standards for the DoD to be used for budget, management, and
productivity improvement purposes.
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S Establishing and maintaining an internal management control program to
control waste, fraud, and mismanagement.
• Advise and assist the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on
administration and organization of the contract audit function within the DoD.
• Establish and supervise uniform DoD policies, principles, and procedures for
administrative matters related to contract audit.
• Analyze resource requirements and use of personnel to accomplish the
contract audit needs of the DoD.
• Coordinate and interface with other DoD Components having interest in the
contract audit mission and related activities, including the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition and Technology), the Inspector General of the DoD, the
Military Departments, and the Defense Logistics Agency.
• Interact with the Congress on issues involving the contract audit function of
the DoD, including interface with the GAO on pertinent audits.
• Conduct analyses, develop plans, provide advice, recommend changes, and
issue guidance on DoD contract audit organization structure and management
practices.
• Interact with the Defense industry on major areas of concern involving
contract audit activity.
• Perform such other activities in the area of contract audit as the Secretary or
Deputy Secretary of Defense may prescribe.
The above functions are carried out with the support of the following key
OSD personnel:
• Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)










































Figure 2-5, Flow of Acquisition Authority, from [Ref 3]
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D. AUTHORITY FOR DEFENSE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION
The authority for DoD to conduct systems acquisition (i.e., to develop, produce
and field weapons systems) flows from four principal sources. These "sources" include
the Law (legal basis), Executive Direction, OMB Circular A- 109 and the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). [Ref 2:p. 5]
A brief synopsis of each of these follows.
1. The Law
Statutory authority from Congress provides the legal basis for systems
acquisition. Some of the most prominent laws are:
• Armed Services Procurement Act (1947), as amended, the original law, now
essentially replaced by subsequent legislation.
Small Business Act (1963), as amended
Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (1983), as amended.
Competition in Contracting Act (1984).
DoD Procurement Reform Act (1985).
DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols).
Title 10, United States Code (U.S. Armed Forces and DoD Organization).
Annual authorization and appropriations legislation, which in recent years has
contained substantial new'or amended statutory requirements.
2. Executive Direction
Authority and guidance also emanates from the Executive Branch in the form of
executive orders, national security directives and other departmental or agency
regulations. Examples include:
• Executive Order (E.O.) 12352 (1982), which directed procurement reforms
and establishment of the FAR.
• National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219 (1986), which directed
implementation of recommendations of the President's Blue Ribbon (Packard)
Commission on Defense Management.
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• National Security Review (NSR) 11 (1989), which directed the Defense
Management Review (DMR) and subsequent Defense Management Report to
the President.
3. OMB Circular A-109
This document defines the system acquisition process as a "sequence of
acquisition activities starting from the agency's mission needs, with its capabilities,
priorities and resources (dollars), extending through introduction into use or successful
achievement of program objectives." It establishes the basic acquisition policy for
federal agencies, particularly for major programs, and includes requirements to:
• Express needs and objectives in mission terms.
• Emphasize competitive exploration of alternative system design concepts.
• Communicate with Congress early (and frequently).
• Establish clear lines of management authority, and designate a program
'
manager for each major program.
• Designate an agency acquisition focal point.
• Avoid a premature commitment to full scale development and production.
4. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
The FAR is the primary regulation for use by all Federal agencies for acquisition
of supplies and services with appropriated funds. This document, published in 1984,
consolidated the major procurement regulations of the various departments and agencies.
The intent was to standardize content and decrease the volume of regulatory guidance
and to establish a consistent set of procurement rules throughout government. The FAR
applies to acquisition of all goods and services. It directs the defense program manager in
many ways, including contract-award procedures, acquisition planning, warranties and
establishing guidelines for competition. Besides the FAR, each agency has a supplement
to describe its own particular ways of doing business. The DoD's supplement is called the
DFARS (Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement).
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E. DEFENSE ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PROCESS
With participation of all three parties, Defense Acquisition Management has a
complex web of Life Cycle Process (It will be explained later in this chapter in detail)
and decision points between each phase of this process. To understand this process, major
documents and some key oversight committees are discussed here.
The Department of Defense has implemented the provisions of OMB Circular A-
109 via "The 5000 series." These documents, which guide defense acquisition, include:
• DoD Directive 5000.1 (Defense Acquisition), the broad policy directive.
• DoD Instruction 5000.2 (Defense Acquisition Management Policies and
Procedures), which implements this policy.
Related major policy directives are DoD Directive 5134.1 (Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition)), 30 September 1992, and DoD Directive 5000.49 (Defense
Acquisition Board), 11 September 1989.
DoD Directive 5000.1, approved and signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
establishes broad policies, which govern acquisition of major, non-major and highly
sensitive classified defense acquisition programs. It attempts to rationalize and explain
the interfaces between the Requirements Generation Process, the Acquisition
Management System and the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS).
These systems and their interfaces (i.e., intersections) are illustrated in Figure 2-6.
As indicated on the figure 2-6, the three "decision-making support system " must
interact and interface with one another in order for the acquisition process to work
effectively. The first interface between the Requirements Generation System and the
Acquisition Management System occurs at Milestone 0, and this interface is supported by
a review by the Joint Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC reviews requirements prior
to each milestone review by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). Milestone I marks








Figure 2-6, Three Major Decision-Making Support Systems, from [Ref 3]
DoDD 5000.1 also includes the following broad policies:
• Long-range planning will be based on best estimates of future fiscal resources.
• Mission needs shall be initially expressed in broad operational capability
terms.
• Acquisition process shall be structured in discrete phases separated by major
decision points.
• A full range of alternatives must be considered before starting a new
acquisition program.
• Sensitive information and technologies must be identified early and protected.
• Acquisition strategies shall be tailored to accomplish program objectives and
control risk.
• Risk and risk management shall be addressed at each milestone decision point.
• Contract type must permit equitable and sensible allocation of risk between
government and industry.
• Broad cost, schedule, and performance parameters will be established at the
new start decision, then refined and expanded for subsequent program
baselines.
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• Competition will be used to the maximum extent practicable.
• Short and clear lines of authority and accountability will be established.
• Milestone decisions will be delegated to the lowest level deemed appropriate.
• Boards, councils, committees and staffs may provide advice and assessments,
but shall not issue programmatic direction, nor impede the orderly progress of
programs through the acquisition process.
• Systems, logistics and materiel commands shall focus on supporting deployed
forces, managing non-PEO programs, providing support services to PEOs and
PMs, and managing acquisition-related activities such as test, laboratory and
support centers.
• Each military department shall establish an independent operational test
activity.
DoD Instruction 5000.2 provides detailed procedures necessary to implement the
policies of DoDD 5000.1. It discusses processes involved with the following acquisition
management functional areas:
• Requirements Evolution and Affordability
• Configuration and Data Management
• Acquisition Planning and Risk Management
• Business Management and Contracts
• Engineering and Manufacturing
• Test and Evaluation
• Special Situations: Defense Enterprise Programs, Joint Programs and
Assignment of Program Oversight
• Logistics and Other Infrastructure
• Defense Acquisition Board Process
DoD 5000.2 also describes a model consisting of four major milestones and four
phases of the "life cycle management system. "These phases and milestones are illustrated
and described in greater detail in later part of this chapter.
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB): The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is the
name given to the life-cycle, decision-making process through which major programs
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proceed from requirements and concept definition through production and deployment. It
provides the formal oversight/management mechanism for many major defense
acquisition programs (ACAT ID). The DAB replaced the former Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council and Joint Requirements Management Board review
processes. Formal meetings are held at each milestone to review accomplishments of the
previous life cycle phase and assess readiness to proceed into the next phase. Typical
issues addressed in the DAB proceedings include cost growth, schedule delays, technical
threshold breaches, supportability issues, acquisition strategy, threat assessment, test and
evaluation highlights, cooperative development/joint service concerns, manpower
evaluation, and operational effectiveness/suitability. The DAB is issue-oriented, and the
result of a DAB review is a go or no-go decision from the USD (A&T), which is
documented in an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM).
The DAB review (and USD (A&T) milestone decision) only approves a program
to proceed; it has no direct role in the resource allocation process, although the
USD(A&T) can direct the comptroller to withhold funds from a program.
DAB members include:
• Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), Chairman
• Vice Chairman JCS, Vice Chairman
• Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition)
• Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E)
• Component (Service) Acquisition Executives (CAEs) - Army, Navy, Air Force
• Comptroller, DoD
• Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation
(ASD(PA&E))
• Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
• Chairman of Cognizant DAB Committee
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The DAB (as a review body) reviews about 60 major defense acquisition
programs (ACAT ID); another 60 or so ACAT IC programs are managed at the
Component (or Service) Acquisition Executive level. Each service and defense agency
has its own version of the life-cycle process, which parallels the DAB process. Those
parallel processes are used for managing programs that do not require OSD decisions,
and for reviewing ACAT ID programs prior to a DAB. Following is a summary of the
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Figure 2-8, Acquisition Milestones and Phases, from [Ref 3]
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1. Life-Cycle Management Process
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD (A&T)) uses the Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB) process to manage the life cycle of major acquisition
programs. The services and defense agencies have similar processes to manage other than
major programs, which are analogous to the DAB model. The Life-cycle process consists
of decision points, or milestones, and periods of time, or phases.
The life cycle of a weapon system program begins with planning before the
program is approved or officially begins, and takes the program through research,
development, production, deployment, support and, finally, disposal. Reference to life-
cycle in the acquisition business, such as total life cycle costs of developing, producing,
deploying, supporting and disposing of a system to include all costs associated with the
system, literally means from cradle to grave. Defense systems normally take from 12-15
years from identification of a warfighting deficiency to fielding of a system to satisfy that
deficiency. Completion of a program often costs deploying, or fielding, the system so that
a predetermined number of operational forces have the system and the capability of using
it, a point called initial operational capability (IOC). During those 12-15 years the
program is controlled through a series of steps involving periodic business and technical
decisions. These decisions are scheduled into the overall strategy (i.e., the acquisition
strategy) to acquire the system. They provide both the program manager and senior
officials in the service/agency, and OSD officials such as the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, USD (A&T), who is the. Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), the
framework with which to review major programs, monitor and administer progress,
identify problems and make corrections.
There is an overlap between the production and deployment and operations and
support phases. Also the production of a system could last for many years, and that the
support for a system must begin with the initial system fielding and continue throughout
the system's life. Major upgrades to systems no longer in production must compete with
other potential alternatives at a Milestone I decision point. Most programs follow the
process illustrated in Figure 2-8. However; if a new system essentially is an updated
version of an existing one, or is one in which a proven or available technology or system
is to be used (i.e., non-developmental items (NDI)), a program possibly could omit a
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omit a milestone or phase or accomplish multiple phases or technical functions
simultaneously (concurrency) to accelerate the process. This process is often referred to
as tailoring. Milestone decisions for major programs are made by the USD (A) after
program review by the respective Defense Acquisition Board Committee and Defense
Acquisition Board. [Ref 2p. 25]
2. Program Management in Defense Acquisition
Department of Defense (DoD) policy calls for the systems acquisition process to
be directed by a responsible manager under the concept of program management. The
terms program and project are used interchangeably The role of the Program Manager
(PM), or Project Manager; is to direct the development, production and initial
deployment (as a minimum) of a system. This must be done within limits of cost,
schedule, performance and logistics support objectives approved by the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition (USD (A)) or head of the Military Department (service) or
defense agency, or designee. The PM's role, then, is to be the agent of the service or
defense agency in the management of a weapon system acquisition program within the
defense acquisition process.
Program Management may be defined as:
A special management approach used to provide centralized authority and
responsibility (on a team or taskforce basis) for the priority
accomplishments of a spec fled project or task. This approach involves
the timely integration of divergent specialties and activities onto coherent,
coordinated management structure. [Ref 2:p. 39]
Program management must take into account diverse interests and points of view.
Second, it facilitates tailoring the management system and techniques to the uniqueness
of the program. Third, it represents integration of a complex system of differing but
related functional and discipline areas, that must eventually work together to achieve
program goals.
Program Manager's Perspective:
The effective PM should have the "Big picture" perspective of his program
including in-depth knowledge of the interrelationships among its elements. An effective
PM:
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• Is a leader and a manager not primarily a task "doer"
• Understands the requirements environmental factors, organizations, activities,
constraints and motivations impacting his program
• Knows and is capable of working within the established framework, managerial
systems and processes that provide funding and other decisions for the
program to proceed
• Comprehends and puts to use the basic skills of management planning
organizing, staffing
)
leading and controlling, so people and systems harmonize
to produce the desired results
• Coordinates the work of defense industry contractors, consultants, in-house
engineers and logisticians, contracting officers and others, whether assigned
directly to the program office or supporting it thorough some form of matrix
arrangement
• Builds support for the program and monitors reactions and perceptions, which
help or impede progress
• Serves both the military needs of the user in the field and the priority and
funding constraints imposed by managers in the Pentagon and service/defense
agency headquarters.
Why is program management used in the Defense Acquisition? Program
management provides a single point of contact who is the major force for directing the
system through its evolution, development, production and deployment. The PM, while
perhaps being unable to control the environment, has management authority over
business and technical aspects of a specific program. The PM has only one responsibility-
managing that program-and accountability is clear. For defense acquisition programs,
industry follows a process similar to that used by the DoD. Often a contractor will staff
and operate the program office parallel with that employed by the military program office
for whom they are performing their contractual effort.
Considering all the factors mentioned above, DoD specifies guidelines, which
every Program Manager should follow to some extent. This regulation is intended to
guide the Program Manager, and let him design his program while applying the latest
management techniques. Regardless of its implication, lets look at the Defense
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Acquisition Management Process closer in terms of phases, steps and key boards, players
involving.
Major programs have a similar chain of responsibility. The Program Manager is
responsible for the efficient execution of the program. PMs guide their program from
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rigure 2-9, Acquisition Categories (ACAT) Classification, from [Ref 3]
Programs are categorized in to four different levels called Acquisition Categories
(ACAT) according to their Research and Development, and procurement dollar values.
For each level, the decision authority and required reports vary.
"ACAT" STRATIFICATION
• ACAT ID: DAB Review
Designed by D A E
Decision by D A E
• ACATIC: Component (Svc Hq) Review
Designated by D A E
Decision by Svc Sec/CAE
• ACATIA: MAISRC Review (ACAT IAM)
Designated by ASD (C 3 I)
Decision by ASD(C 3 I)
• ACAT II: Does Not Meet ACAT I Criteria
Designated by Svc Sec/CAE
Decision by Svc Sec/CAE
• ACAT III: All Others
Designated by CAE




















Figure 2-10, ACAT Stratification, from [Ref 3]
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The Acquisition Process provides a logical flow of actions beginning with
defining mission statements and well-defined system specific requirements. This process
is accomplished using an incremental commitment of resources, converting dollars into
systems.
3. Requriements Generation Process
Requirements generation may be called also the first step of the Defense
Acquisition Management, based on a continuing process of assessing the capabilities of
the current force structure (people and materiel) to meet the projected threat, while taking
into account opportunities for technological advancement, cost savings, and changes in
national policy or doctrine. The output of this process, known as mission area analysis
(MAA) (or mission area assessment), is a deficiency, or a mismatch between current
capabilities and the future (projected) threat. Once identified, deficiencies need to be
resolved, and the first choice is a change in organization, doctrine or tactics, or perhaps
additional training. These alternatives, often called non-materiel alternatives, are
investigated first because of their relatively low cost and ease (i.e., speed) of
implementation. Should non-materiel alternatives prove incapable of resolving the
deficiency, we are forced to look for materiel solutions. The overall requirements


























Figure 2-11, Requirements Generation, from [Ref 3]
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The order ofprecedence for consideration of materiel alternatives is as follows:
• Use or modification of an existing U.S. military system.
• Use or modification of an existing commercially developed or allied system
(Non-Developmental Item (NDI) approach).
• Cooperative research and development program with one or more allied
nations.
• New Joint-Service program.
• New Service-unique development program.
Once a determination is made that a materiel solution is required to satisfy a
deficiency, a Mission Need Statement (MNS) is generated. The Mission Need Statement
documents the deficiency in operational capability, not system specific terms. The
services have different organizations involved in the mission area analysis and MNS
generation processes. In the Army, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is
responsible for performing MAA and generating the MNS. Navy Fleet CINCs develop
MNSs in coordination with the OPNAV staff. The Marine Corps Combat Developments
Command (MCCDC) (specifically the Warfighting Center) does MAA and writes MNSs
for the Marine Corps. In the Air Force, MAA is performed and the major operating
commands, Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, Air Force Space Command,
and the Air Force component of Strategic Command generates MNSs. The
processing/approval process for ACAT I level MNSs is illustrated in Figure 2-12.
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Figure 2-12, MNS Flow, from [Ref 3]
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Mission Need Statements for potential Major Defense Acquisition Programs
(ACAT I) are initially forwarded to the JROC for validation and approval.
Validation is the process of documentation by an operational authority (other than
the user) to confirm the identified need and operational requirement. As a maximum, the
operational validation authority (the JROC for ACAT I level MNSs) reviews the MNS,
confirms that a non-materiel solution is not feasible, and assesses the joint service
potential.
Approval is the formal or official sanction of the identified need and/or
operational capabilities described in the MNS. Approval also certifies that the MNS has
been subject to the processes contained in the DoD 5000 series and appropriate JROC
Memoranda of Policy (MOPs).
Should the MNS be approved by the JROC, it will be forwarded to the DAB with
a recommendation that concept direction studies be initiated. Based on a review by the
DAB Committee and the DAB, the USD (A) makes the final decision as to whether or
not the warfighting deficiency warrants the initiation of concept direction studies. The
resulting Milestone decision is documented in an Acquisition Decision Memorandum
(ADM), signed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (the DAE). The MNSs
for potential ACAT I level programs, which are disapproved, are returned to the
originating service/agency.
The validation and approval authority for ACAT II, and III mission need
statements is the service (or defense agency) or CINC of the respective Unified or
Specified Command (as appropriate). Approved MNSs for less than ACAT I level
programs are forwarded to the component acquisition executive for action (determination
of whether concept direction studies will be initiated).
(1) Milestone 0. See Figure 2-14
(2) Phase - Concept Exploration and Definition. Issuance of
Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) by the USD (A&T) initiates Phase 0. Basic
purpose of this phase is "on paper studies of alternatives." During this phase, the
operating command initiating the Mission Needs Statement (MNS) leads the study effort,
establishes a concept action group to explore material alternatives, accomplishes an
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Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), and prepares a brief Operational Requirements
Document (ORD) with accompanying Requirements Correlation Matrix (RCM).
During the latter part of this phase, the implementing command appoints a
Program Manager (PM) to establish the systems program office (usually called Program
Manager Office) cadre and begin preparing the acquisition strategy, program
management plan, and the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) for Milestone I review.
The Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) documents identifies proposed
cost, schedule, and performance parameters which establish the "contract" between the
Program Manager and the milestone decision authority.
(3) Milestone I. See Figure 2-16
(4) Phase I- Program Definition Risk and Reduction. Defense Acquisition
Executive (DAE) issues a Milestone I Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)
authorizing start of Phase I-Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR). The
objectives of Phase I are to prove critical technologies and process are understood.
Prototyping and test and evaluation are used to demonstrate and validate the concept. The
DAB thoroughly reviews program accomplishments at this time because, from this point
on significant resources will be committed.
(5) Milestone II. See Figure 2-18
(6) Phase II-Engineering and Manufacturing Development. The DAE
approves the proposed updated acquisition strategy and Development Baseline, and the
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase begins with the issuance of
the Milestone II ADM. The ADM will baseline low rate initial production quantities, and
specific cost, schedule, and performance criteria to be achieved.
The objectives of EMD phase are to translate the design approach from
DEM/VAL into a stable design, validate the manufacturing/production process, and
demonstrate that the system produced will meet contract specs and satisfy minimum
acceptable operational performance requirements.
During this phase the Program Office will revalidate the threat, test the
design under realistic operational conditions as possible, and refine the acquisition
strategy and system cost estimates. They will also develop a Production Baseline that
better portrays program cost, schedule and performance objectives.
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Major programs entering this phase, because of magnitude of the
resources expanded, receive a tremendous amount of attention from Congress, the Office
of Budget and Management (OMB), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and
the Service Chiefs.
(7) Phase Ill-Production and Deployment. The Production and
Deployment Phase begins with issuance of approving ADM and its subsequent Program
Management Directive (PMD). The objectives of this phase are weapon systems quality
and performance. In the production phase, the system is produced in quantity using
assembly line methods and/fielded in large numbers. Trying to keep stable production
rates in the face of annual budget perturbations becomes a major challenge.
The Operations and Support is no longer a separate phase but really is a
continuation of the Phase III. Its objectives are to correct quality and safety problems,
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OBJECTIVES POSSIBLE REOUIRED ACCOMPLISHMENTS
• Explore Various Material • Validated System Threat Assessment
Alternatives • Assess PROs and CONs of Each
Alternative
• Define Most Promising
• Develop Proposed Acquisition
System Concept(s) Strategy for Each Promising
• Develop Supporting Analyses Alternative That Includes:
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Figure 2-14, Phase 0, from [Ref 3]
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Figure 2-15 Milestone I, from [Ref 3]
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PHASE I
PROGRAM DEFINITION AND RISK REDUCTION (PDRR)
OBJECTIVES POSSIBLE REQUIRED ACCOMPLISHMENTS
• BETTER DEFINE CRITICAL DESIGN
CHARACTERISTICS AND EXPECTED
CAPABILITIES
• DEMONSTRATE INCORPORATION OF
TECHNOLOGIES CRITICAL TO SYSTEM
DESIGN
• PROVE THAT CRITICAL PROCESSES ARE
VHDERSTOOD AND ATTAINABLE
• DEVELOP ANALYSES/INFORMATION
NEEDED TO SUPPORT MS H DECISION
• ESTABLISH A PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT
BASELINE AND REFINED PROGRAM
COST, SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
• VAUDA TED SYSTEM THREAT ASSESSMENT
• IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR COST, SCHEDULE. AND
PERFORMANCE TRADE-OFF.
- A DEVELOPMENT BASELINE WHICH INCLUDES COST.
SCHEDULE. AND PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
• DEVELOPMENT TEST RESULTS WHICH IDENTIFY
TECHNOLOGICAL RISKAREAS
A REFINED ACQUISITION STRATEGY WHICH IDENTIFIES:
Hich-riik areas and rbk-manaccmcnt approaches
Low-rate Initial Production quantities, if appropriate
- ASSESS DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE CAPABILITY TO
SUPPORT PROGRAM
• IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSEQUENCES AND MITIGATION MEASURES
• UPDATE LIFE-CYCLE COST ASSESSMENTS AND ANNUAL
FUNDING REQUIREMENTS (SHOW AFFORDABIL1TY)
• PROGRA MMING OF ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO SUPPORT
THE PROPOSED PROGRAM
• PROPOSE PROGRAM-SPECIFICEOTCK/fESM TOENTER





Figure 2-16, Phase I, from [Ref 3]
MILESTONE II
APPROVAL to ENTER ENGINEERING and MANUFACTURING
DEVELOPMENT (EMD)
OBJECTIVES DECISION CRITERIA ACQUISITION DECISIONMEMORANDUM (ADM)
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PERFORMANCE BE PROGRAMMED - LRIP QUANTITIES
Figure 2-17, Milestone II, from [Ref 3]
52
PHASE II
ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING DEVELOPMENT
OBJECTIVES POSSIBLE REQUIRED
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
• TRANSLATE MOST PROMISING








• VALIDATED SYSTEM THREAT ASSESSMENT
• TEST RESULTS THAT PROVIDE A REALISTIC
PORTRAIT OF PERFORMANCE UNDER
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS
• LOW-RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION EXPERIENCE THAT:
- Verifies Ihc adequacy of tbc manufacturing
production process
- Confirms design stability and producibility
Provides a realistic estimate of production
costs
• A REFINED ACQUISITION STRATEGY AND SYSTEM
COST ESTIMATE
• A PRODUCTION BASELINE WHICH INCLUDES COST,
SCHEDULE. AND PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
• ASSESS DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE CAPABILITY TO
SUPPORT PROGRAM
• A SYSTEM CONFIGURATION BASEUNE
IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSEQUENCES AND MmCATION MEASURES
• UPDATE LIFE-CYCLE COST ASSESSMENTS AND
ANNUAL FUNDING RF.QU IREMENTS (Show Long-Range
Affordability)







Figure 2-18, Phase II, from [Ref 3]
F. BUSINESS AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF SYSTEMS ACQUISTION
Management of the systems acquisition process not only involves mechanisms for
decision making, funding and responding to congressional oversight, but also the daily
tasks of managing the business and technical aspects of the program. The acquisition
program manager (PM) must attend to frequent external influences of oversight and
funding, many of which are beyond his direct control. [Ref 2:p. 35]
1. Business and Financial Functions
The procurement contract for goods and services is the heart of the acquisition
process. Business and financial functions, the latter including management of acquisition
funds, include:
• Acquisition plan (the contracting checklist) and acquisition strategy (the overall
"road map")
• Acquisition Program Baseline
• Contract types, award and monitoring
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• Cost estimating
• Formulating input for the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM), the
budget and other programmatic or financial documentation in support of the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
• Request for Proposal Preparation
• Source selection
• Contractor surveillance Program office administration and personnel
• Budget execution (obligating funds and paying the bills)
• Technical data rights
• Total quality management.
The acquisition-planning phase of the contracting process includes the system
requirement (need) determination, requirement definition and specification and
procurement request. Once potential contractors are notified through the procurement
request, the source-selection process moves through solicitation, evaluation of proposals,
negotiation and contract award. The contract is then administered and monitored for
compliance to ensure product(s) are delivered as agreed.
2. Technical Management Functions
Technical management is a broad term including the management of a totally
integrated effort of system engineering, test and evaluation (T&E), production and
logistics support over the system life cycle, rts goal is timely deployment of an effective
system, sustaining it, and satisfying the need at an affordable cost. Technical
management involves balancing a system's cost, schedule and effectiveness. Cost
includes funds required to design, develop, produce, operate and support and dispose of a
system. Schedule includes the time it takes to design, develop, produce and deploy a fully
supported system. Effectiveness is the degree to which a system can be expected to
achieve a set of specific mission requirements. Technical management includes:
System/product definition process (establishing the baseline)
• Acquisition Program Baseline (APS)
• Design engineering
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Systems engineering (putting the pieces together)
Computer resources, including software integrated logistics support
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
Reliability, availability and maintainability




Manufacturing process and control




Technical management can be described as an input, process and output. The
input is the need or requirement. The process is how the technical activities are managed.
The output is the end item. This is a. feedback loop, which improves the end item based
on customer (user) comments and recommendations.
G. RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS
The Resource Allocation process is a lengthy and complicated process that
involves everyone. It is affected by current fiscal allocations, possible threats to the U.S.,
available technology and so on. The Resource Allocation Process conducted through the




III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS(RAP), BUDGET, AND
NATIONAL SECURITY /QDR
A. INTRODUCTION
Along with numerous complicated processes, the Resource Allocation Process is
the main control power in the Legislative Branch for the Defense Acquisition
Management. In terms of translating the U.S. National Security needs and balancing
budget requirements for other agencies, the Congress influences the Defense Acquisition
Management System by using its legitimate power. Sometimes the process improves
acquisition efficiency, and sometimes it produces unwanted and unexpected side effects.
In order to understand the internal process of the Defense Acquisition System in the
Executive Branch, we need to understand the relationship between the Legislative and the
Executive Branches with respect to the Defense Acquisition Process.
This intricate funding allocation process creates difficulties for Program
Managers because of funding instability. Program efficiency lies in both funding stability
or flexibility by providing means to adapt to a rapidly changing environment. By
examining the Resource Allocation Process (RAP) and situation of the Program Manager,
potential opportunities for program efficiency may be identified.
B. RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS (RAP); THE PLANNING,
PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS)
Resources for Department of Defense (DoD) activities whether weapon systems
or personnel cost, are provided through the resource allocation process. Resources
include dollars (funds), material, people, facilities, and equipment. The four phases of the
Resource Allocation Process (RAP) are:
Phase 1 - Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
Phase 2 - Enactment
Phase 3 - Apportionment
Phase 4 - Execution
From the standpoint of developing, producing, fielding, and supporting weapon
systems, the PPBS is the focus of attention in the service and defense agency
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headquarters activities, while program managers and their Program Executive Officers
(PEOs) are equally concerned with execution. The following is a brief discussion of these
four phases. [Ref 2:p. 29]
1. Phase I - Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
The PPBS is the official management system, which ultimately produces DoD's
portion of the President's budget. It is unique to DoD and was originally introduced to the
Department by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1962. The PPBS is a cyclic
process with three distinct but interrelated phases: Planning, Programming and
Budgeting. It provides a formal, systematic structure for making decisions on policy,
strategy, and the development of forces and capabilities to accomplish anticipated
missions. The PPBS provides for a time-phased allocation of resources and submission of
supporting documentation. Its objective is to provide operational commanders with the










Figure 3-1, PPBS, from [Ref 3]
The PPBS processes are based on and consistent with objectives, policies,
priorities, and strategies derived from National Security Decision Directives. Throughout
the three major phases of planning, programming, and budgeting, the Secretary of
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Defense will provide centralized policy direction while placing program execution
authority and responsibility with the DoD Components: The DoD Components will
provide advice and information as requested by OSD to permit the latter to assess
execution end accountability. Participatory management involving the DoD Components
shall be used in each phase to achieve the objective of providing the operational
commanders-in-chief (CINCs) the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable
within resource constraints. The decisions (as modified by legislation or Secretary of
Defense direction) associated with the three major phases of the PPBS will be reflected in
the FYDP as Secretary of Defense approved programs for the military functions of the
Department of Defense. The FYDP will address the prior, current, budget and program
years. [Ref8]
The Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEFj manages the PPBS with the
advice and assistance of the Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB), which he
chairs. The DPRB includes the Under Secretaries of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation (ASD (PA&E)), and the DoD Comptroller.
Until 1986, the PPBS was an annual process through which DoD prepared its annual
budget. Beginning in 1987 with submission of the first two-year defense budget (for
fiscal years 1988-89), PPBS itself became a biennial procedure. A complete PPBS cycle
takes 24 months (February of year one to February of year three). The PPBS also results
in periodic updates (at least twice annually) to the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP). The FYDP reflects requirements for the outyears (years beyond the next budget
year) based on DoD planning to meet national defense objectives. It represents those
programs approved by the Secretary of Defense (via the DEPSECDEF and the DPRB). A
brief description of each of the segments of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System follows.
a. Planning
This phase is the responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (USD (P)). The planning phase is nine months long, starting in February of each
odd-numbered calendar year (the "off year" for programming and budgeting) and ending
in October with the publication of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).
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b. Programming
This phase is managed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program
Analysis and Evaluation (ASD (PA&E)). It is the bridge between planning (with broad
fiscal guidance) and budgeting (which meticulously prices each program element). It
begins with the issuing of the draft Defense Planning Guidance in August of each odd
numbered calendar year and ends with the submission of the service and defense agency
Program Objectives Memoranda (POMs) in April of each even-numbered calendar year.
Military departments, defense agencies and one Commander in Chief (CINC), (CINC,
Special Operations Command) prepare POMs based on guidance contained in the DPG.
The POM is the service (or defense agency) request for resources to accomplish its
mission(s).
c. Budgeting
The Comptroller of the DoD is responsible for this phase. Based on OSD
review/comment on the POMs, Budget Estimate Submissions (BESs) are prepared and
forwarded (in September of the even-numbered calendar years) to OSD by the military
departments and defense agencies. Service and defense agency budgets are reviewed and
the final DoD budget then goes to OMB to be incorporated into the President's budget
submission to Congress, thus ending the budgeting phase.
PPBS RESPONSIBILITIES
















figure 3-2, PPBS Responsibilities, from [Ref 3]
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Figure 3-2 summarizes the responsible agency and key product of each
PPBS segment.
2. Phase II - Enactment
Enactment is the process through which the Congress reviews the President's
budget, conducts hearings, and passes legislation. Enactment begins when the President
submits his annual budget to the Congress at the beginning of each calendar year of law
(on the first Monday in February) and ends when the President signs the annual
authorization and appropriation bills approximately eight months later. Authorization
approves programs and specifies maximum funding levels and quantities of systems to be
procured. The Appropriations process provides the budget authority with which to incur
obligations (i.e., obligate and expend (or outlay) funds). Even though DoD has submitted
a two-year budget to Congress since January 1987, Congress authorizes most programs
and funding on an annual basis and appropriates funds on an annual basis. There are a
few exceptions, the most notable being programs for which multiyear (rather than annual)
procurements have been approved. However, even multiyear procurements must be










• PROCUREMENT (excluding SCN) 3 YEARS
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Figure 3-4, DoD Appropriations, from [Ref 3]
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3. Phase III - Apportionment
Once the authorization and appropriations legislation is signed into law by the
President, funds are made available. Apportionment occurs when the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), provides these funds to DoD and other Federal
agencies. Subsequently, DoD allocates funds within the Department through action by
the DoD Comptroller and his counterparts in the services and defense agencies.
4. Phase IV - Execution
The execution phase occurs when appropriated funds are spent on defense
programs. In other words, it is the process of obligating funds (awarding contracts) and
expending funds (writing checks to pay bills).
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Figure 3-5, Resource Allocation Process-Overlap, from [Ref 3]
The current fiscal year budget is being executed while enactment of next year's is
underway, and programming for the following budget is in process. Planning is
essentially a continuous process.
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It is incumbent on program managers and other officials responsible for any
aspect of resource allocation to be aware of the sequence of activities and to understand
where they are in the RAP. Because the DAB and PPBS fairly are independent processes,
it is possible for a program to be approved to enter the next phase in the life cycle but
have insufficient funds to execute that phase. Figure 3-6 compares and contrasts the
PPBS and acquisition life-cycle process.







PPBS DEPSECDEF Biennial/Calendar Funding
Figure 3-6, DoD Life-Cycle and Resource Management Systems, from [Ref
2:p.32]
It is important to keep in mind that the PPBS is a calendar-driven system and that
the acquisition life cycle is event-driven. Avoiding a mismatch or disconnect between
programmatic requirements and available funding demands close attention on the parts of
program managers and their respective Program Executive Officers.
The interface between the weapons acquisition process, as defined in DoD
Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2, and the PPBS is achieved by designated
membership of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) and the
Defense Resources Board (DRB), and the requirement to develop an acquisition strategy
for all major systems. [Ref 8]
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Figure 3-7, The Resource Allocation Process (RAP), from [Ref 3]
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5. DESCRIPTION OF KEY PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND
BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS) DOCUMENTS
a. Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA)
The JLRSA shall be submitted by the JCS to provide transition from long-
range to mid-range strategic planning. The JLRSA is intended to stimulate more sharply
focused strategic studies. Additionally, the JLRSA influences the development of the
NMSD. [Ref 9]
b. National Military Strategy Document (NMSD)
The NMSD shall be submitted by the JCS to provide military advice to the
President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. It shall contain a
concise, comprehensive military appraisal of the threat to U.S. interests and objectives
worldwide, a statement of recommended military objectives derived from national
objectives, and the recommended military strategy to attain national objectives. It shall
include a summary of the JCS planning force levels required to execute the approved
national military strategy with a reasonable assurance of success, and views on the
attainability of these forces in consideration of fiscal responsibility, manpower resources,
material availability, technology, industrial capacity, and interoperability in joint and
cross-Service programs. The NMSD shall also provide an appraisal of the capabilities
and risks associated with programmed force levels, based on the planning forces
considered necessary to execute the strategy as a benchmark, and shall recommend
changes to the force planning and programming guidance. The NMSD provides a vehicle
for an exchange of views on defense policy among the President, the Secretary of





• FORMERLY CALLED THE JOINT STRATEGIC
PLANNING DOCUMENT (JSPD)
• CONTAINS JCS ADVICE TO THE NSC,
SECDEF, AND PRESIDENT
• Recommended Military Strategy
• Required Force Structure
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• IS M)T FISCALLY CONSTRAINED
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Figure 3-8, National Military Strategy Document (NMSD), from [Ref 3]
c. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
After consideration of the military advice of the JCS, as expressed in the
JLRSA and NSMD, a draft of the DPG is issued to solicit comments of all DoD
Components, including the CINCs, on the major issues, problems, and resource
constraints in developing and programming forces to execute the policy, strategy, and
management direction. The draft DPG is also provided to the Department of State, the
Staff of the National Security Council, and the Office of Management and Budget for
comment. The final version of the DPG, which is an output of the planning phase, serves
as an authoritative statement directing defense policy, strategy, force and resource
planning, and fiscal guidance for development of the POMs.. The DPG will consist of the
following elements: near- and long-term threat assessment and opportunities; policy and
strategy guidance; force planning guidance; resource planning guidance; fiscal guidance;




PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT DOCUMENT
IN THE DoD BUDGET PROCESS
CONTAINS THE COLLECTIVE WORK OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, JCS, THE SERVICES, AND
THE PRESIDENT
IS THE BASIS FOR THE SERVICES TO PREPARE THEIR
PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUMS (POMs)
CONTAINS FISCAL GUIDANCE, BUT DOES NOT LIMIT
FUNDING FOR SPECIFIC PROGRAMS
PROVIDES THE BASIC RATIONALE AND JUSTIFICATION
FOR DoD's PROGRAMS AND BUDGETS AND CONTAINS
THE TOTAL OBLIGATIONAUTHORITY (TOA) LIMITS
FOR EACH SERVICE
Figure 3-9, Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), from [Ref 3]
d. Program Objective Memoranda (POM)
Annually, each Military Department and Defense Agency must prepare
and submit to the Secretary of Defense a POM that is consistent with the strategy and
guidance, both programmatic and fiscal, as stated in the DPG. Major issues that are
required to be resolved during the year of submission must be identified. Supporting
information for POMs will be in accordance with the annual POM Preparation
Instructions or requirements established by DoD Directive or Instruction.
e. Program Decision Memoranda (PDM)
DRB program review decisions shall be recorded in a set of PDMs, signed
by the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and distributed to the DoD
Components and OMB. The PDMs will then be the basis for the budget submissions.
[Ref 9]
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C. NATIONAL SECURITY; THE WAY FROM QDR 1997 TO THE PM
Probably the broadest official overview of U.S. National Security is Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR). The biggest driver in the QDR (with 15 percent share in GDP),
is military R&D and procurement. Interaction between QDR, budget process and the
Defense Acquisition Management is highly complicated in terms of planning and
executing this strategy.
1. Importance ofQDR
It is necessary to predict the future world environment for every nation. In order
properly to allocate resources and counter prospective threats. After assessing potential
threats, effective countermeasures will be taken and the people in charge of security and
wealth of the country will make trade off to get the best defensive alternative. As part of
its own national security, the U.S. undertook the QDR
2. Driver ofQDR
As Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen stated, the QDR is strategy-driven, but
it was developed within realistic budget considerations. Indeed, at some of the debates
held by the National Defense Panel (NDP) and hearings for the QDR before Congress,
the budget was a significant factor.
And, frankly, I do not see a strong support on a bipartisan basis for
increasing defense spending in the absence of a major conflict in the
foreseeable future. I think that we will be fortunate we can hold it roughly
$250 billion, where it is today in constant dollars, and I wanted the
military to operate with that assumption in the background. [Ref 1 0]
Statement of Secdef in testimony for QDR actually reveals that the budget is more
than just a constraint.
3. Time Frame ofQDR
It is difficult to predict accurately the future world, but it is imperative to be
proactive based on solid insight. There is always a strong tendency to reflect on history
and prepare for what has happened, rather than for what will happen. To avoid this, the
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QDR 1 997 was developed to help identify the military capability needed throughout the
1997-2015 timeframe and beyond.
4. The Expected Environment
Uncertainty is the keyword, especially when we talk about ten years in the future
and beyond. In the short term, no super power competitor is expected. But fractured
zones like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea are potential problems. Some peacekeeping or
humanitarian operations are already engaged or need to be ready for Bosnia, Zaire, The
Republic of Congo, Albania and many more.
As the time span we examine increases, the possibility of asymmetric challenges
tends to increase. Most countries are aware that they are not capable to defeat U.S.
military forces one on one. Thus, they have been searching for weaknesses to exploit
such as communication, and Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) protection. In addition,
it is possible for those type of countries to acquire mass destruction weapon systems even
with limited budgets.
In the long term, China and Russia are also candidates to pose a threat to the U.S.
Finally, it is important to note that this projection of the security
environment rests on two fundamental assumptions: that the United States
will remain politically and militarily engaged in the world over the next 1
5
to 20 years, and that it will maintain military superiority over current and
potential rivals. If the United States were to withdraw from its
international commitments, relinquish its diplomatic leadership, or
relinquish its military superiority, the world would become an even more
dangerous place, and the threats to the United States, our allies, friends,
and interests would be even more severe. [Ref 10]
5. What Needs To Be Done?
The strategy to go from current environment to a more peaceful and desirable
world environment is explained in the QDR 1 997 as cited below:
From that analysis of the global environment, we developed an
overarching defense strategy to deal with the world today and tomorrow,
identify required military capabilities, and define the programs and
policies needed to support them. Building on the President's National
Security Strategy, we determined that U.S. defense strategy for the near
and long term must continue to shape the strategic environment to advance
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U.S. interests, maintain the capability to respond to the full spectrum of
threats, and prepare now for the threats and dangers of tomorrow and
beyond. Underlying this strategy is the inescapable reality that as a global
power with global interests to protect, the United States must continue to
remain engaged with the world, diplomatically, economically, and
militarily. [Ref 10]
The QDR examined three alternative paths that differed in where they accepted
risks and emphasized investment over the near term, midterm, and long term.
One path is to focus more on current dangers and opportunities. Two other
options, near- and long-term paths, are either to decrease the potential strength of the
future force structure or increase the lethality of current structure. In order to shape the
world to obtain stability and deter the prospective challenges, it is important to maintain a
high degree of readiness by investing accordingly. Deterrence will enable the U.S. to save
money and lives in the long run by avoiding armed conflict. The best path is the balance
between being ready for the present threat and modernizing for the future, recognizing
that interests and responsibilities in the world do not permit the U.S. to choose between
the two. This approach forces the U.S. to reallocate resources and priorities to achieve the
best balance of capabilities for shaping the world, responding to threats, and preparing for
future challenges the entire time span covered by the QDR.
6. "Shape" and Acquisition System Relationship
In the shape-respond-prepare strategy defined in the QDR, shaping the world is
quite important to the Defense Acquisition Management and the PM. Being prepared for
the future, in which hostile and/or potentially hostile states, who will acquire new
capabilities demand increased and stable investment in modernization in order to exploit
the revolution in technology and to transform force towards Joint Vision 2010. The
ability to shape the world needs to pay attention to Defense Acquisition. By providing
capable and effective systems to the user, the Defense Acquisition System has to be more
effective and efficient to produce these weapon systems.
One of the most important factors of being efficient and effective in the Defense
Acquisition System is stable funding. In the last decade, failure to address fiscal problems
undermined the ability to execute a coherent "shape" strategy. For different reasons,
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projected increases in funding for modernization have continually been delayed as
modernization funds migrated to operations and support accounts to pay current bills.
This unexpected fund shifts to other accounts caused cost increases and delay in the
programs. Even some of the programs were cancelled because of these funding problems.
Investment Challenge
DoD Budget Trends
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Figure 3-10, Trends of Procurements Budget, from [Ref 10]
7. Impact of the QDR Decisions on R&D and Procurement
To save extensive amounts of money and effort in the future, shaping the world
would be cheaper than responding to conflict. According to the QDR, this strategy needs
to invest about $60 billion per year to have enough capability for shaping the world. But
procurement dollars in the proposed budgets missed that goal by $15 billion. This means
either that some of the prospective programs essential to implement the QDR strategy
will die before they. are started or that some current programs will get cut by the now
familiar "salami slice" method.
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8. The Way To Handle Procurement Funding Problem
This current funding environment mentioned above requires serious measures to
survive in this unique strategy-driven, budget-constrained environment. The current
defense resource allocation process generally starts with objectives and creates strategy
first, then deals with resource constraints. If this process has, in spite of reform, not
efficient and effective enough, why not turn the process around? Starting with constraints
and building strategy and force levels from a realistic estimate of the means may be an
option in this budget-constrained environment. Also program budget proposals should be
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Figure 3-11, QDR Procurement Goal, from [Ref 10]
D. SUMMARY
The following 15 to 20 years will not be as low risk as some people think just
because there is no cold war. In the light of the QDR, the threat is changing and the U.S.
armed forces must be ready to meet these threats. In order to achieve this goal, readiness
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and acquisition of new systems for future conflicts should be considered seriously. With
20 percent share of the DoD Budget, procurement is critical in shaping the world events.
Because of this, we need to examine the problems in the Defense Management
Acquisition Process closely. Root causes of these problems must be eliminated by
aggressive reforms. Senior officials must give appropriate tools and authority to their
PMs and trust them to handle issues. The budget does not support the modernization




The Acquisition System has been the topic of dissatisfaction for decades. The
Rockefeller Report of 1953, the Symington Plan of 1961, the Blue Ribbon Report of
1970, the Commission of Government Procurement of 1973, the Packard Commission
Report, Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Federal Acquisition Reform Act
of 1996 and many others in between indicate that the Acquisition System has been
developing over years. Lately, by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)
and the National Performance Review (NPR), the current administration has been
working on measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the system, focusing on the
ability to track the outcomes of the efforts and eliminate non-value-added steps in the
system.
Having said that, the root cause of the Acquisition System challenges are quite
intricate to overcome in the short term. The lessons learned, emerging technologies, and
new management concepts are combining gradually to make the system better. In this
manner, no one can say that "this is enough" or "this is the best system we've got." By
looking at the efforts in the past, current situations and initiatives ongoing now, we may
begin to understand this evaluating acquisition system better and define the needs for the
future.
B. NEED FOR CHANGE-BASIC PROBLEMS
Time poses a new set of political, economic, and military security challenges for
the United States: regional or limited conflicts; proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, both nuclear and non-nuclear; risk to its economic well-being; and the
.
possible failure of democratic reform in the former Soviet Bloc and elsewhere. Officials
are committed to maintaining the U.S. military's edge over opponents. That means
maintaining superior people, training, logistics, and weapons system technology. The
advantage the U.S. now has allowed to deter aggression and to prevail quickly with
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minimum casualties when required to employ force. It is necessary to maintain a lean,
high-tech, agile, ready-to-fight military force during a time in which: the threats are
changing and unpredictable; by Fiscal Year (FY) 1997, defense spending will have
declined in real terms by over 40 percent from FY85, and advanced technology is
increasingly available to the world.
The DoD's (DoD) Bottom-Up Review provides the vision, and the blueprint, for
meeting the security challenges of the post-Cold War world — responding to threats
anywhere in the world where U.S. interests are at risk. In today's environment, the current
process will not always be able to meet the Department's need. The DoD will not be able
to carry out this blueprint without dramatic changes in its acquisition processes — from
determining what the Department needs, to logistics support and reutilization
requirements. [Ref 1 1 ]
1. Examples of the Need for Change
It is not difficult to see why change is imperative. Stories illustrating the need for
reform abound. For example:
The Department of Defense is often unable to acquire state-of-the-art commercial
technology. A commercial company was planning to introduce a radio with special
encryption features sought by -DoD. Because the item had not been sold in substantial
quantities to the public, it could not quality for an exemption to DoD's requirement that
the company provide cost data. Since the company did not generate such information for
its commercial customers, it would have had to set up a new accounting system to track
and verify the information. If it wanted to sell the radios to DoD, it could not afford to do
that. The result was that DoD was stuck buying old technology while commercial
customers bought the new, more capable radios.
The DoD is often unable to buy from commercial companies. Even when their
costs are cheaper or DoD must buy a commercial product, because it is the only one they
can get. A military hospital wanted to buy aspirin. The low bid was $3.98 per unit. The
DoD ended up having to buy from the next lowest bidder for $4.40 per unit, because the
low bidder was a commercial company that refused to disturb its long-standing
subcontractor relationships to fulfill DoD requirements that a certain percentage of its
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subcontractors were small, disadvantaged businesses. The additional cost to DoD was
$107,000 over the life of the contract.
The Air Force attempted to negotiate a new contract with an aircraft manufacturer
to supply spare parts for its military version of a commercial aircraft. The company was
only manufacturing the spares in its commercial division, which did not meet the
requirements for doing business with the Government. In January, 1988, the company
first notified the Air Force that it would need a commercial item exemption in order to
provide these spares. It took until June, 1992; four and a half years, until the Air Force
and the company were able to agree on contract terms and conditions. During that time,
countless hours were spent by the contractor, the Air Force, and Office of the Secretary
of Defense personnel attempting to determine which of the 278 clauses in the Air Force
contract could be waived. They finally received waivers on approximately 1 1 clauses.
Commercial divisions of a major defense electronics company simply refuse to do
business with the Government. They cite several reasons: their commercial division
accounting systems cannot provide the cost data required by DoD; they do not want to
incur the added cost of complying with Government-unique terms and conditions; they
are wary of giving the Government the right to audit proprietary cost and financial
information; and fear losing their commercial proprietary data and software. Because
many of these requirements are required to be "flowed down" by a prime contractor to its
subcontractor, and there is no exception for inter-company transfers, not only can these
divisions not sell to the DoD, but they cannot transfer their parts to divisions of the
company that do sell to the Government without changing their commercial processes to
accommodate the Government requirements. This means that the company either cannot
use its own company's semiconductors, or cannot charge the Government for the
components, because the semiconductor division of the company does not have an
approved Government accounting system. One company projected it will have included
over $1,000,000 worth of semiconductors at no cost to the Government on just two
current DoD programs.
The Department of Defense's costs of doing business are too great. DoD sent out a
solicitation for a quantity of ant bait expected to cost $25,595, based on the last purchase
made. This meant that DoD had to use the standard, lengthy solicitation procedures rather
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than existing streamlined procedures for "small purchases" ~ those $25,000 or less. The
solicitation was 29 pages long, and it took 227 days to award the contract. As it turned
out, the lowest bid came in under $25,000. Had the threshold for "small purchases" been
higher, the contracting officer would have been able to use simplified procedures at the
outset, and the contract could have been awarded in 27 days instead of 227.
As a 1991 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded,
the existing acquisition system:
Results in higher prices to DoD (even when lower-cost commercial
alternatives exist for the same requirements), loss of a broad domestic
production base that could be available to defense for peacetime and surge
demands, and lack of access to commercial state-of-the-art technologies.
Additionally, the wall between engineers and scientists engaged in
commercial and military work impedes the kind of shoulder-to-shoulder
contact that is the essence of technology transfer and that is basic to
achieving greater job stability and growth opportunities for the U.S. work
force.
To meet the new National Security challenges (political, economic, and military)
the DoD must:
,
• Maintain its technological superiority, and a strong, globally competitive
National industrial base that can support the Nation's future defense needs, by
being able to: .
•S Rapidly purchase commercial and other state-of-the-art products and
technology from reliable suppliers who utilize the latest manufacturing
and management techniques;
S Assist in the conversion of defense-unique companies to dual-use
production;
S Aid in the transfer of military technology to the commercial sector;
•S Preserve defense-unique core capabilities.
• Reduce acquisition costs (including DoD's overhead costs) through:
S The adoption by DoD of business processes characteristic of world-class
customers and suppliers (including processes that encourage DoD's
suppliers to do the same);
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S Relief from the requirement to impose Government-unique terms and
conditions on its contractors to the maximum extent practicable.
2. Maintaining Technological Superiority and A Strong National
Industrial Base
While the DoD drove technology developments in many areas for years, today the
pace of commercial technology advancement in many sectors far exceeds Government
sponsored technology efforts. Commercial technology advancements are outpacing DoD
sponsored efforts in the same sectors that are key underlying technologies for military
superiority (e.g., computers, software, integrated circuits, communications, and advanced
materials). The current development and production of DoD systems takes too long. The
design cycle for commercial technology is approximately three to five years, in DoD it is
eight to ten years. Many DoD systems are technologically obsolescent at the time they
are fielded.
The Department of Defense must have unimpeded access to commercial
technologies more quickly than other countries if it is to maintain its technological
superiority. Yet, many current laws and regulations are barriers to DoD's ability to
purchase of state-of-the-art commercial items, the conversion of defense companies to
making commercial products on a competitive basis, and the integration of the defense
and commercial industrial bases.
The following are most often identified by industry as significant barriers:
• Unique laws and regulations imposed on Government contractors, such as:
Government cost accounting standards; the requirement to provide product
cost data; record keeping and reporting requirements; audit and oversight
requirements; access to competitively sensitive financial data; socio-economic
and mandatory source requirements; requirements for rights In technical data;
security requirements; and DoD-unique product and process specifications
and standards.
• The instability of the Department's requirements and budget which makes it
difficult to predict the market.
• Imposition of Government-unique rules on commercial subcontractors.
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• The Government's right to terminate contracts at will.
• Industry's perception there is a tremendous risk that a contractor will
inadvertently fail to comply with a Government rule or regulation that will
lead to criminal or civil penalties, and a loss of the company's good name in
the commercial marketplace.
Companies that do both commercial and Government business often are forced to
segregate their facilities to ensure they can track, monitor, and report compliance with
Government requirements, and account for inventories of components traceable to
Government progress payments and their manufacturing origin. If the facilities are not
segregated, the need to ensure compliance with Government requirements adds to the
company's overhead costs, typically for both military and commercial products, since
once the facility has the compliance systems in place, they are generally applied to the
entire facility. These additional costs, of course, make the company's commercial and
military products less competitive in the global marketplace.
In the past, many companies were willing to accept these additional costs because
of the large volume of sales to the DoD, and the fact that the Government reimbursed
them for the costs on products it purchased. However, as DoD's share of many
contractors' sales continues to shrink, the companies are often no longer willing to accept
the additional costs and production inefficiencies associated with complying with
Government administrative requirements. The cost is too high in today's competitive
environment.
The semiconductor market is a perfect example of this situation. In 1 965 the DoD
accounted for over 75 percent of all U.S. semiconductor purchases. By 1995, the
Semiconductor Industry Association predicts that sales to DoD will be around one
percent of all U.S. company sales. When DoD sales are such a small part of their market,
companies are less willing to let the Government dictate to them the terms and conditions
under which they will sell their product. They would rather concentrate on their
commercial business or sell their products to the Government through third parties as a
means of avoiding the unique Government rules and regulations.
In addition, with a procurement budget that has declined more than 60 percent in
real terms since FY85, the DoD and the Nation can no longer afford the luxury of
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maintaining a totally unique defense industrial base. The sharp decline in defense
business, and the resultant mergers, acquisitions, and bankruptcies of defense companies,
is causing a dramatic shrinkage in the defense industrial base. Defense companies that are
now supporting our existing weapons systems may not exist when we need them in the
future. A reconstituted or larger defense production and logistics capability, if necessary,
would have to be based on a National industrial base composed primarily of companies
producing commercial or dual-use products, many of whom do not or will not do
business with DoD because they will not alter their traditional business practices to
comply with Government-unique rules and regulations.
Finally, the burden of defense reductions is felt most sharply by those companies
who rely heavily on DoD for the majority of their sales, and small businesses. Those
companies who are most dependent on defense business are laying off hundreds of
thousands of employees. This is not a temporary layoff pending an up-swing in the
economy. These jobs are gone for good unless the company can convert to producing for
a commercial market that will make up for the decline in defense business, or adopt
another strategy to accommodate reduced defense expenditures while remaining a DoD-
only supplier. Small businesses not only disproportionately feel the loss of business
revenue, but also the unique burdens placed on Government suppliers. They least of all
can afford to bear the spillover of additional overhead costs of doing business with the
Government. — the additional employees to ensure compliance, lawyers to explain
Government-unique laws and regulations, and the legal risks associated with an
inadvertent failure to comply with a rule foreign to commercial business practice, but
required when selling to DoD, onto their commercial products. [Ref 1 1 ]
3. Reducing Acquisition Costs Through Adoption of Business Practices
Characteristic of World Class Suppliers
The Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government, using an
indirect measure of the cost of DoD regulatory system, calculated that "the overhead, or
management and control costs, associated with the DoD acquisition process were about
40 percent of DoD acquisition budget, as compared to 5 percent to 15 percent for
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commercial firms [Ref 12]." This includes both the Government's internal costs, and the
costs borne by DoD contractors and ultimately reimbursed by the Government.
An Office of Technology Assessment study pegged the costs of DoD's regulatory
maze at $15 to $75 billion, and concluded that the benefits could not be worth this
additional cost. [Holding the Edge: Maintaining the Defense Technology Base, Volume
II Appendix, CCGPO (April 1989)]. Other studies have indicated that DoD contractors
incur additional costs on Government contracts, for identical items being sold to
commercial customers, of about 30 percent over their commercial contracts (e.g.,
Integrating Commercial and Military Technologies for National Security: An Agenda for
Change, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C., April 1991)).
The problem is that DoD's acquisition system is a complex web of laws,
regulations, and policies, adopted for laudable reasons over many years. For example:
• Military specifications were adopted to ensure that the DoD got a quality
product that would meet the users needs while using a procurement process
that would allow it to buy from the lowest bidder; and to ensure
standardization to enable ease of logistics support;
• Cost or pricing data requirements were established to ensure the Government
received the same information the contractor had, for use in negotiating a fair
and reasonable price;
• Cost Accounting Standards were adopted to provide accounting criteria that
would result in comparable costs for like circumstances within a company and
to ensure contractors properly allocated costs to DoD contracts;
• Checks on the Government's authority were established, in essence, to
"protect the people" (in this case suppliers), from certain Government
demands, such as the inappropriate use of fixed-price research and
development contracts;
• Rights in Technical Data have been requested to ensure that the Government
can operate, repair, and maintain its equipment without fear of being held
hostage to a sole-source supplier for spare parts and to obtain additional
equipment and spare parts at reasonable prices through competition; and,
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• Laws such as the Davis-Bacon Act, requirements to use small businesses, and
buy only American-made products, were adopted to further a particular public
interest.
While each rule individually has (or had) a purpose for its adoption, and may be
important to the process as a whole, it often adds no value to the product itself, and when
combined, contributes to an overloaded system that is often paralyzed and ineffectual,
and at best cumbersome and complex. If there were any doubt that the current system
exacts a significant cost in terms of performance, quality, innovation, and prices the
Government pays, one need only ask the Government's senior acquisition executives. In a
recent U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board survey, a majority of Senior Executive
Service members in the Federal Government stated "that the procurement process
frequently results in procurement decisions that are neither cost effective nor in the best
interests of the Government [Ref 13]."
There are other problems that must be solved. The DoD acquisition system, not
unlike that of many companies in the U.S. and around the world, can best be
characterized as an "industrial era bureaucracy in an information age." DoD and many of
its suppliers are still practicing many management techniques and philosophies that were
fundamentally developed by Adam Smith and Alfred Sloan. These philosophies are based
on the following:
• Specialization, which led to economies of scale, as the most efficient way to
produce products;
• Rigid lines of authority and reporting;
• Creation of rules or practices to address every contingency, if possible;
• Extensive paperwork to document that appropriate actions occurred;
• Detailed design and "how-to" specifications as the only way to ensure an
acceptable product, and to ensure a "level" playing field for competition;
• In-process inspections, audits and reviews as the most effective means to
assure compliance with the system; and,
• Programming people to conform to established procedures ensured that
systems would be predictable, workable, and safe.
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The result of these philosophies, however, as authors Michael Hammer and James
Champy noted in their book, Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business
Revolution, is a system that is less than perfect in today's world. Systems of this type:
• Create functional stove-piping in which no one person is accountable for an
entire process;
• Result in so many hand-offs during staffing that errors and waiting time
dominate the system; and,
• Make the ability of any one person to change the process small if not
impossible.
This system is at least partially to blame for the characterization by one senior
service acquisition official that the DoD acquisition hierarchy had an unquenchable
appetite for data and paperwork, was quick to second-guess decisions, and worse yet,
revisited decisions endlessly.
People are encouraged to conform, to follow the rules, to document their actions,
and to avoid risk, rather than innovate and use good business judgment. The system
rewards those who follow the rules and avoid risk. And it allows everyone to point the
finger at someone else in the process. Congress points to DoD's management, DoD points
to the Congress, and people within the services point to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense leadership.
The layer upon layer of organizations, legislation, regulations, policies and
oversight is an impediment to DoD's adoption of business processes that are
characteristic of world-class customers and suppliers today. Most companies have begun
to recognize that in today's world, flexibility and agility are more important than
efficiencies achieved by specialization and other benefits attributable to the old
management techniques. Here with decreasing defense budget, efficiency is also
important and the problem is to achieve both of effectiveness and efficiency together.
DoD is unlike most commercial companies. It is populated by military and civil
service personnel who have a different personnel system than most companies. Senior
political appointees rotate frequently. There is no profit and loss sheet, no bottom line.
No commercial company is scrutinized like DoD is scrutinized by Congress and the
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general public. And no commercial organization utilizes the acquisition process to
achieve social goals to the extent required of Government agencies.
Yet the critical management issues are the same:
• There are too many people in the organization;
• There are too many regulations;
• There is resistance to change and a suspicion of process management; and,
• There is considerable "stove-piping" of functions and personnel, and massive
coordination requirements.
Thanks to the ability and dedication of the thousands of acquisition professionals
in the Department of Defense and the assistance of many contractors, DoD has been able
to develop and acquire the best weapons and support systems in the world. DoD and
contractor personnel accomplished this feat not because of the system but in spite of it.
And they did so at a price, both in terms of the sheer expense to the Nation and eroded
public confidence in the DoD acquisition system. It is a price the Nation can no longer
afford to pay.
While there have already been reductions in the acquisition workforce, continuing
reductions in both military and civilian personnel (active duty reduced by 520,000;
civilians by 200,000) and the need to reduce DoD's infrastructure mean that there will be
farther reductions in the acquisition workforce. The Department of Defense cannot
accommodate these reductions without making changes in the current acquisition
process. It must reduce the cost of the acquisition process by the elimination of activities
that, although being performed by many dedicated and hardworking personnel, are not
necessary or cost effective in today's environment.
No one is suggesting that there be a wholesale deletion of safeguards that have
been designed to ensure the integrity of the Government acquisition process nor the
wholesale removal of laws intended to further U.S. social policies. Rather, DoD must
advocate a balancing of the risks associated with reducing oversight and the cost to both
industry and the Government of compliance. In the case of social programs, the costs of
maintaining records to ensure compliance must be balanced against: the contribution to
be made by requiring compliance when making small purchases; and, the lost
opportunities when commercial companies and small businesses are unwilling to change
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their standard business practices and contractor relationships in order to comply with a
Government socioeconomic policy imposed only on Government contractors. [Ref 11]
C. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE SO FAR?
From the beginning of Defense Acquisition in U.S. history till now, there have
been many efforts to solve or ease problems in this area. Implementation of acquisition
related reports, laws, and research are important to examine, in order to understand this
long journey. Without knowing where we are and how we came to this point, it is quite
difficult to find the way to the ultimate solution of the acquisition problems.
Some of the proposals in these studies are already implemented and then
reevaluated in the following periods. Some were improved, some were abandoned
because of their outcomes, but efforts are still going on with hope of reaching perfection.
1. From 1960s to 1987
Since the early 1960s, many studies analyzing the defense weapons acquisition
process have noted its strength, its deficiencies, and its needed reforms. From 1960 to
1987, there were twelve major studies. Despite the large number of studies and the
similarity of their findings, problems of cost growth, lengthy cycle time of acquiring new
systems remained significant. To overcome these problems and do it better, cheaper, and
faster, a more comprehensive approach was required ~ an approach based on a better
understanding ofhow and why defense business works the way it does.
During Kennedy and Johnson administrations (1960-1968), in response to
numerous cost overruns of the 1950s and early 1960s, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense discouraged cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts in favor of fixed-price and incentive
contracts. In the early 1960s, Secretary McNamara and his management team developed
and implemented a number of sensible improvements. One was the Planning
Programming Budgeting System (PPBS), which provided the Secretary and the President
with an organized approach to major program decisions and to the allocation of resources
within DoD, though it was not designed to have a major impact on the acquisition
process. Another was the creation of the Office of Systems Analysis, to perform cost-
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effectiveness studies. The Services was encouraged to do the same. Despite these
significant improvements in DoD management, cost increase could not be stopped.
The McNamara team also developed and implemented Total Package
Procurement (TPP), which required simultaneous bidding, on a fixed-priced basis, for
both the first (development) and second (production) stages as a means of preventing a
winning contractor (for the first stage) from facing little or no competition for the second
stage. It was applied on such systems as the Lockheed C-5A cargo airplane, General
Dynamics F-l 1 1 fighter aircraft, and the Grumman F-14A Tomcat fighter aircraft. All of
these had large cost overruns, and Total Package Procurement was judged to be
ineffective.
This failure in procurement reform prompted the Congress in 1 969 to appoint the
Commission on Government Procurement (soon followed by the Nixon administration's
Blue Ribbon Panel on Defense Procurement, in 1970) to identify the causes of weapons
cost overruns and to propose new methods of cost control.
During the Nixon and Ford administrations (1968-1976), Defense Secretary
Melvin Laird and Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard returned some autonomy to
the individual Services, but maintained Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
involvement in program decisions. Deputy Secretary Packard established the Defense
Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) to advise him of the status of each major
defense system to allow for careful evaluation before proceeding to the next phase. In
1972, Mr. Packard formed a second group, the Cost Analysis Improvement Group
(CAIG), to provide OSD staff with independent program cost estimates to present the
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council and to determine uniform DoD cost-
estimating standards. Equally important, Mr. Packard sought ways to limit the expensive
practice of putting a weapon system into production before completing its development.
This reform, called fly-before-buy, entailed the development of prototypes and
competitive fly-offs before choosing a contractor and entering production.
In May 1970, Mr. Packard issued a memorandum citing additional ways by which
the acquisition of major weapon systems could be improved. The memorandum served as
the basis for DoD Directive 5000.1. The memorandum and directive set fourth Mr.
Packard's view that "successful development, production, and deployment of major
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defense systems are primarily dependent upon competent people, rational priorities, and
clearly defined responsibilities." Program Managers were to be given adequate authority
to make major decisions, recognition and rewards for good work, and more opportunity
for career advancement. As constructive as this directive was, it produced few
encouraging changes within military services. Reassignments for additional tours of duty
to program management positions were rare, except in case of non-rated (non-flying
status) officers in the Air Force. There was little or no accountability for cost growth on
acquisition programs.
During 1969 and 1970, the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel studied the
Pentagon and stressed the need for, among other reforms, an independent weapons testing
office. The panel reexamined other problems that had accompanied hardware
development for several years, including major cost increases, schedule delays, and
failures in technical performance. The panel concluded that the causes were largely of
management, that officers serving as program managers generally lacked any special
training or expertise in their duties, were rotated at short intervals, usually had no
assignment overlap with their predecessors, and saw little potential for career
advancement in program management.
Mr. Packard left the Defense Department in 1971. Near the time of his departure,
he expressed disappointment at DoD's resistance to improvements in the acquisition
process. He had wanted to apply the lessons of his success with Hewlett-Packard
Company, which he frequently described as finding good men for the job of the program
manager, assigning them, and then leaving them alone.
In 1976, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (part of Office of Management
and Budget) published Circular A- 109, which required Mission Area Analysis (MAA) in
early phases of the acquisition process and more competition throughout the process.
During the Carter administration (1976-1980), Defense Secretary Harold Brown
sought to regain some of the authority in weapons acquisition Mr. Packard had
relinquished to the services.
In 1981, President Reagan's Defense Secretary, Casper Weinberger, expressed
interest in reforming the acquisition process. Whereas his predecessor Secretary Brown
had sought to tighten the control over key aspects of the process, Secretary Weinberger
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implemented what he called controlled decentralization, whereby subordinate line
executives, especially service program managers, were to be held responsible for
executing policy decisions made by the Secretary after consultation with his top civilian
and military advisers.
Early in the Reagan administration (1981), Secretary Weinberger and Deputy
Secretary Frank Carlucci instituted a set of thirty-two reforms (the Carlucci initiatives) to
the acquisition process. The core idea of the Carlucci initiatives was that over-regulation
thwarts efficiency and increases costs.
In 1986, the Presidential Panel on defense, the Packard Commission,
characterized the defense acquisition process as expensive, inefficient, and cumbersome.
It observed that "the increasing complexity of the process means unnecessary delays are
incurred in acquiring goods and supplies and that higher costs are paid for what is
acquired [Ref 13]."
2. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act is probably the most significant single
piece of legislation impacting the acquisition system since the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1948. In FASA, we see the Congress and the administration
implementing many of the recommendations of the Section 800 Panel to streamline the
Federal Acquisition System.
There are a great many changes in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act with
respect to how we buy items on behalf of the Federal Government. These changes
include every aspect of the procurement process from how we determine our
requirements to close-out of a contract. An overview of all of the changes can be found in
the "Federal Acquisition Institute Analysis, Guide to the Federal Acquisition
Regulation."
The major changes to the procurement process occurred in five areas:
• Authorization to conduct Pilot Programs (not covered in this paper).
• Commercial items and practices. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act
emphasizes the role of market research in the acquisition process, creates a
preference for purchasing commercial items, eliminates certain statutory
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restrictions for the purchases of commercial items on prime and subcontracts,
and provides for use of commercial practices even where a commercial items
is not procured. For more information on these changes, see the FAR Parts 10,
11 and 12.
• Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) and Simplified Acquisition
Procedures (SAPs). Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act created the
Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT at $100,000 and provided for the use
of Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAPs)). Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act ties use of Simplified Acquisition Procedures to FACNET
certification (this tie is temporarily suspended under Federal Acquisition
Reform Act). All procurements under the Simplified Acquisition Threshold
are relieved from a number of statutory restrictions. For more information on
these changes, see the FAR Part 13.
• Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET). FACNET was created to
provide a "single face" to industry for the purposes of electronic commerce
with the Federal (jovernment. It is based on a philosophy of pushing public
Request For Quotations out to the vendor community as opposed to having the
vendor community come look for them. For more information about FACNET
see FAR Part 4 and 1 3 and FACNET section in this chapter.
• Reduced Requirements for Cost or Pricing Data. Significant changes were
made to the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) by Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act. Contracting officers no longer operate under a presumption
that Cost or Pricing data is required when they are at the $500,000 threshold.
Rather, the contracting officer is required to determine if one of a number of
exemptions apply or whether a waiver is appropriate. If an exemption applies
or a waiver is appropriate, cost or pricing data may not be obtained. For more
information see FAR Subpart 15.8. [Ref 14]
3. Integrated Product Team (IPT)
On May 10, 1995, Secretary Perry directed the Department to apply the Integrated
Product and Process Development (IPPD) concept of using Integrated Product Teams
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throughout the acquisition process. That direction has been captured in the draft
revisions to the DoD Directive 5000.1 and the DoD Instruction 5000.2. This guide
clarifies the instructions contained in those directives for Overarching Integrated Product
Teams (OIPTs) and Working-Level Integrated Product Teams (WIPT). Program
Integrated Product Teams are described in the draft "Guide to Implementation and
Management of Integrated Product and Process Development in Department of Defense
Acquisition." This guide is intended to facilitate organizing and leading effective and
efficient Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) that will serve the Acquisition Community and
ultimately enhance our capability to provide systems that satisfy the warfighter's needs.
The guidance in the extracts from draft DoD Instruction 5000.2 will be
mandatory. The other guidelines are not mandatory, but they represent sound business
practices and will be included in the discretionary section of the Acquisition Deskbook.
This guide describes the Integrated Product Team process for ACAT ID and IAM
acquisition programs, but the concepts should be considered for all programs.
These guidelines are not intended in any way to detract from the responsibility
and authority of the Program Manager (PM). The Integrated Product Team activities
discussed on the following pages are designed to assist the Program Manager by
engaging Office of the Secretary of Defense and Service Staff in early and continuous
support and by identifying and resolving issues as early and as quickly as possible. The
staffs mission is to ensure the Program Manager's success.
a. Purpose ofIntegrated Product Teams
As Secretary Perry stated in his May 10, 1995, memorandum, the
Integrated Product Team concept for oversight and review is intended to replace the
current sequential process that produces a product at the program office level which
frequently, when reviewed at higher levels, is modified substantially or even rejected.
Such a sequential review and approval process takes considerably longer than an
Integrated Product Team approach that simultaneously takes advantage of all members'
expertise and produces an acceptable product the first time. The purpose of Integrated
Product Teams is to facilitate decision-making by making recommendations based on
timely input from the entire team.
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Organization Teams Focus Participant
Responsibilities
OSD and OIPT • Strategic Guidance • Program Success
Components • Tailoring • Functional Area Leadership
• Program Assessment • Independent Assessment
• Resolve Issues Elevated by • Issue Resolution
WIPTs
WIPTs • Planning for Program Success • Functional Knowledge & Experience
• Opportunities for Acquisition • Empowered Contribution
Reform (e.g., innovation, • Recommendations for Program Success
streamlining) • Communicate Status & Unresolved
• Identify / Resolve Program Issues
Issues
• Program Status
Program Teams Program • Program Execution • Manage Complete Scope of Program,
& System IPTs • Identify & Implement Resources & Risk
Contractors Acquisition Reform • Integrate Government & Contractor
Efforts for Program Success
• Report Program Status & Issues
Figure 4-1, Do ) Integra ted Product Team Types, Focus and Responsibilities, from
[Ref 15]
b. Integrated Product Teams in the Oversight and Review Process
For ACAT ID and IAM programs, mandatory guidance for Overarching
Integrated Product Teams and Working-level Integrated Product Teams is provided in
Part 5.4 of the new draft DoD Instruction 5000.2 as extracted below. (Mandatory
guidance for program Integrated Product Teams is provided in Part 4.2 of the draft DoD
Instruction 5000.2.)
Integrated Product Teams are an integral part of the defense acquisition
oversight and review process. The Secretary of Defense has directed that the Department
perform as many acquisition functions as possible, including oversight and review, using
Integrated Product Teams. These Integrated Product Teams shall function in a spirit of
teamwork with participants empowered and authorized, to the maximum extent possible,
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to make commitments for the organization or the functional area they represent.
Integrated Product Teams are composed of representatives from all appropriate functional
disciplines working together to build successful programs and enabling decision-makers




Open discussions with no secrets
2. Qualified, empowered team members
3. Consistent, success-oriented, proactive participation
4. Continuous "up-the-line" communications
5. Reasoned disagreement
6. Issues raised and resolved early
Figure 4-2, Integrated Product Team Structure, from [Ref 15]
For each program, there will be an Overarching Integrated Product Team
and at least one Working-level Integrated Product Team. Working-level Integrated
Product Teams will focus on a particular topic, such as test, cost/performance,
contracting, etc. An Integrating Integrated Product Team will coordinate Working-level
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Integrated Product Team efforts and cover all topics not otherwise assigned to another
Integrated Product Team.
c. Working-level Integrated Product Team 's Procedures, Roles, and
Responsibilities
The Program Manager, or designee, shall form and lead an Integrating
Integrated Product Team (IIPT) to support the development of strategies for acquisition
and contracts, cost estimates, evaluation of alternatives, logistics management, cost-
performance trade-offs, etc. The Integrating Integrated Product Team will assist the
Program Manager in the development of a Working-level Integrated Product Team
structure to propose to the Overarching Integrated Product Team. The Integrating
Integrated Product Team will also coordinate the activities of the remaining Working-
level Integrated Product Teams and ensure that issues not formally addressed by other
Working-level Integrated Product Teams are reviewed. Working-level Integrated
Product Teams shall meet as required to help the Program Manager plan program
structure and documentation and resolve issues. While there is no one-size-fits-all
Working-level Integrated Product Team approach, there are three basic tenets to which
any approach shall adhere:
(1) The Program Manager is in charge of the program.
(2) Integrated Product Teams are advisory bodies to the Program Manager.
(3) Direct communication between the program office and all levels in the
acquisition oversight and review process is expected as a means of
exchanging information and building trust.
The Leader of each Integrated Product Team will usually be the Program
Manager or the Program Manager's representative. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense action officer may co-chair the Integrated Product Team meetings, at the
invitation of the Program Manager. The following roles and responsibilities apply to all
Working-level Integrated Product Teams:
(1) Assist the Program Manager in developing strategies and in program
planning, as requested by the Program Manager
(2) Establish Integrated Product Team plan of action and milestones
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(3) Propose tailored document and milestone requirements
(4) Review and provide early input to documents
(5) Coordinate Working-level Integrated Product Team activities with the
Overarching Integrated Product Team members
(6) Resolve or elevate issues in a timely manner
(7) Assume responsibility to obtain principals' concurrence on issues, as well as
with applicable documents or portions of documents. [Ref 16]
d. Test Strategy Integrated Product Team
The purpose of the Integrated Product Team is to assist in outlining the
Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) for a major program. The objective of such an
Integrated Product Team is to reach agreement on the strategy and plan by identifying
and resolving issues early, understanding the issues and the rationale for the approach,
and, finally, documenting a quality Test and Evaluation Master Plan that is acceptable to
all organizational levels the first time. [Refl5] .
e. Cost-Performance Integrated Product Team
The purpose of the Cost-Performance Integrated Product Team shall be to
facilitate cost-performance trades and to assist in establishing program cost-range
objectives. Cost objectives shall be used as a management tool. They should be
communicated to industry and used, in part, for source selection and to incentivize
contracts. The nature of the cost-performance trades and the composition of the Cost-
Performance Integrated Product Team shall change as the program matures from concept
to design. As the program matures, the role of the Program Manager in the Cost-
Performance Integrated Product Team increases. The Cost-Performance Integrated
Product Team (normally led by the Program Manager or the Program Manager's
representative and including, at a minimum, the user or user's representative) shall
recommend to the Program Manager performance or engineering and design changes as
long as the threshold values in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) can be achieved. If the changes require ORD/APB
threshold value changes, the leader of the Cost-Performance Integrated Product Team
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shall notify the Program Manager and the Overarching Integrated Product Team leader.
The Program Manager shall ensure that the changes are brought before the ORD and/or
APB approval authorities for decision. [Ref 1 7]
/ Overarching Integrated Product Team Procedures and
Assessments
In support of all ACAT ID and IAM programs, an Overarching Integrated
Product Team (OIPT) shall be formed for each program to provide assistance, oversight,
and review as that program proceeds through its acquisition life-cycle. The Overarching
Integrated Product Team for ACAT ID programs shall be led by the appropriate Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) official (typically the Director of Strategic and Tactical
Systems, the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Space and Acquisition
Management), or the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. (C3I Acquisition),
depending on the program in question). The DASD (C3I Acquisition) will designate the
Overarching Integrated Product Team Leader for each ACAT IAM program.
Overarching Integrated Product Teams shall be composed of the Program Manager,
Program Executive Officer (PEO), Component Staff, Joint Staff, USD(A&T) staff, and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff principals or their representatives, involved in
oversight and review of a particular ACAT ID or IAM program.
The Overarching Integrated Product Team shall first form upon learning
that a program is intended to be initiated to consider the recommendations proposed by
the Integrating Integrated Product Team -- the extent of Working-level Integrated Product
Team support needed for the potential program; who shall participate on the Working-
level Integrated Product Teams; the appropriate milestone for program initiation; and, the
minimum information needed for the program initiation review. Overarching Integrated
Product Teams shall meet as necessary over the life of a program. The Overarching
Integrated Product Team Leader shall take action to resolve issues when requested by any
member of the Overarching Integrated Product Team, or when directed by the Milestone
Decision Authority (MDA). The goal is to resolve as many issues and concerns at the
lowest level possible, and to expeditiously escalate issues that need resolution at a higher
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level, bringing only the highest level issues to the Milestone Decision Authority for
decision.
In support of a planned milestone review by the Defense Acquisition
Board (DAB) or Major Automated Information System Review Council (MAISRC), the
Overarching Integrated Product Team shall normally convene two weeks in advance of
the anticipated review to assess information and recommendations being provided to the
Milestone Decision Authority. Additionally, at that meeting, the Program Manager shall
propose the Working-level Integrated Product Team structure, documentation, and
strategy for the next acquisition phase, for approval by the Milestone Decision Authority.
The Overarching Integrated Product Team Leader, in coordination with the appropriate
Component Acquisition Executive (CAE), shall recommend to the Milestone Decision
Authority whether the anticipated review should go forward as planned.
The Overarching Integrated Product Team leader for ACAT ID or IAM
programs shall provide an independent assessment to the DAB or MAISRC chairs,
principals, and advisors at major program reviews and milestone decision reviews using
information gathered through the Integrated Product Team process. The leader's
independent assessment shall focus on core acquisition management issues and shall take
account of assessments prepared by Overarching Integrated Product Team members.
Assessments will normally be provided by the Overarching Integrated Product Team
members. There should be no surprises at this point, because all team members are
already working the issues in real time, and they should be knowledgeable of their
Overarching Integrated Product Team leader's independent assessment. [Ref 18]
g. Continuous, "up-the-line" Communications
Working-level Integrated Product Team members are expected to ensure
that their leadership is in agreement with what the Integrated Product Team is doing.
When issues arise that exceed the limits of empowerment, the Program Manager or
Integrated Product Team leader must allow members adequate time to coordinate issues
and positions with their principals. There should be no surprises later when the principals




• DASD (C3I Acquisition) Director, Acquisition Oversight, ODASD (C3IA)
• Director, Strategic & Tactical Systems
• ADUSD (Space)
Component Acquisition Executives Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
Component Representatives Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition
• PEO Reform)
• PM Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced
• Operators Technology)
• Senior Information Management Official Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental
User Security)
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics)
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Deputy General Counsel (Acquisition and Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) Deputy Director, Defense Research & Engineering
Director, Defense Procurement Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security)
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
Director, Acquisition Program Integration Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, Test, Systems Engineering & Evaluation Director, Defense Information Systems Agency
Chairman, OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Group (DAB only) DASD(C3)
Director, Counterintelligence & Defense Security DASD (Information Management) (MAISRC only)
Programs, OASD(C3I) (DAB only) Director, Continuous Acquisition and Life Cycle
Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel& Support (CALS)
Readiness) Director, Central Imagery Office
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) Director, Special Programs
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic
Energy)
Figure 4-3, Overarching Integrated Product Team Membership, from [Ref 15]
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h. Reasoned Disagreement
The team is not searching for "lowest common denominator" consensus.
There can be disagreement on how to approach a particular issue, but that disagreement
must be reasoned disagreement based on an alternative plan of action rather than
unyielding opposition. Issues that cannot be resolved by the team must be identified
early so that resolution can be achieved as quickly as possible at the appropriate level.
[Refl5]
L Issues Raised and Resolved Early
The agreements essential to Integrated Product Team success will be
founded on the early identification and resolution of issues. When an issue cannot be
resolved by a Working-level Integrated Product Team, the Program Manager should raise
the issue as quickly as possible to a decision-making level where resolution can be
achieved.
j. Last wordfor Integrated Product Teamfrom Mr. Perry
I need your personal involvement and commitment to
ensure that the concepts of IPPD and Integrated Product Teams are
effectively implemented. By using the best practices from both the public
and private sectors, we can enhance our ability to provide what the
warfighter needs, when needed and at a cost that the Department can
afford. [Ref 15]
4. Electronic Commerce (EC), Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
Use of Electronic Commerce, Electronic Data Interchange to support DoD
procurement processes has been under consideration for some time. A 1988 Deputy
Secretary Defense memo calls for maximum use of Electronic Data Interchange based on
ten years of DoD Electronic Data Interchange investigation and experiments. In 1 990,
Defense Management Review Decision 941 stated, "The strategic goal of DoD's current
efforts is to provide the department with the capability to initiate, conduct, and maintain
its external business related transactions and internal logistics, contracting, and financial
activities without requiring the use of hard copy media." The January 1993 DoD
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Acquisition Law Advisory Panel submitted a report to the Congress that concentrated on
changes that would streamline the defense procurement process. Among the hundreds of
recommendations contained in the report were several that addressed the increased use of
electronic procurement notice and contracting methods. A Presidential Memorandum in
October 1993 reinforced this effort by supporting streamlining procurement through
electronic commerce. In parallel with these activities, a DoD Electronic
Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange In Contracting Process Action Team was formed
and recommended in December 1 993 that a central functional coordinator be designated
to direct the execution of the implementation plan. The DoD Electronic Commerce office
was established under the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform in
1994 to implement the Process Action Team implementation plan and plan for future
electronic commerce activities.
Goals:
• Maximize the use of electronic commerce/electronic data interchange in
contracting
• Develop an implementation plan that when executed would result in:
S Providing information on pending procurements, receiving quotes of
solicitations, and making awards
S At 244 sites within two years (covers 80 percent of DoD's contracting
actions under $25K and 98 percent under $100,000
S Using existing Agency automated contract writing systems and
commercial software and hardware
• Establish a single face to industry
• Support the Federal effort in expanding EC/EDI to other agencies by
developing a Government-wide process that would provide a single face to
industry
• Facilitate the use of EC/EDI in all DoD functional areas as part of the business
reengineering process:
•S Take advantage of a standard DoD infrastructure
S Consolidate individual Service/agency EC/EDI activities into joint
activities as they relate to functional business areas
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•S Establish a single face to industry implementing a common information
processing standards and a common set of business practices and
operational principles
5. Federal Acquisition Network (FACNET)
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 establishes the Federal
Acquisition Network (FACNET) requiring the Government to evolve its acquisition
process from one driven by paperwork into an expedited process based on Electronic
Data interchange (EDI). The electronic system is intended to provide a single face to
industry and interoperability within the Federal sector. The Act establishes parameters for
FACNET built along functional lines, with parameters set forth for Government and
private users. These functions are to be implemented by agencies within five years of
enactment of the Act. The Government-wide FACNET will be designed to:
• Inform the public about Federal contracting opportunities;
• Outline the details of Government solicitations;
• Permit electronic submission of bids and proposals;
• Facilitate responses to questions about solicitations;
• Enhance the quality of data available about the acquisition process; and
• Be accessible to anyone with access to a personal computer and a modem.
[Ref 19]
6. Evolutionary Acquisition (EA)
Evolutionary acquisition is a tailored, streamlined process for acquiring weapons
systems. The Evolutionary Acquisition process is consistent with current guidance and
can help shorten the time between requirement genesis and weapon system availability.
Per Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology) in a memorandum dated 12
January 1995, Evolutionary Acquisition is an alternative practice to be assessed by
program managers (PMs) when developing the acquisition strategy for their individual
programs. Particularly important are relationships among the acquisition executive, user,
user representative, independent tester, supporter, and the developer. These relationships
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must be of high quality for the successful performance of Evolutionary Acquisition
developments.
a. Why Evolutionary Acquisition ?
The use of conventional approaches to the acquisition of large, software-
dominated command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems has not
been supportive of operational commanders in the performance of their command and
control functions. Difficulties arose primarily because it was often not feasible to define,
in detail, what the operational capabilities or functional characteristics for the complete
system were before starting the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)
Phase. If Engineering and Manufacturing Development is initiated without a clear
definition of operational concepts and required system capabilities and the functional
characteristics of the complete system are not known, it is likely the development process
will be long, costly, and unstable, and the system developed will be unsatisfactory.
Studies conducted by the Armed Forces Communication and Electronic
Association and Defense Systems Management College have examined the acquisition
environment likely to emerge from a changed threat perception and rapid world economic
change, with its associated technological advances and realignments. It appears that these
rapid changes will preclude those long periods of stability necessary to develop clear
definitions of system operational concepts, capabilities, and functional characteristics
prior to entering Engineering and Manufacturing Development. This situation implies an
extension of Evolutionary Acquisition processes to other than C(3)I weapons systems.
b. What is Evolutionary Acquisition ?
Evolutionary Acquisition is an acquisition strategy that may be used to
procure a system that is expected to evolve during development and within an approved
architectural framework in order to achieve an overall system capability. An underlying'
factor in Evolutionary Acquisition is the need to quickly field a well-defined core
capability in response to a validated requirement. This is accomplished while planning
for an incremental upgrade program designed to enhance the system eventually. These
increments are each treated as individual acquisitions. Their scope and content being the
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result of: (1) continuous feedback from independent testing agencies, the user (operating
forces), and supporting organizations; and (2) the application of new technology. This is
all balanced against the constraints of time, requirements, and cost.
Considered most broadly, Evolutionary Acquisition consists of several
steps. The first step defines the requirement and the general outline of the system. Then
the succeeding steps in the process sequentially define, fund, develop, test, field, support,
and evaluate increments of the system. This process begins with a core or baseline
system, which is then enhanced through incremental upgrades.
c. What Evolutionary Acquisition is not
Evolutionary Acquisition is not:
• An approach that provides for unconstrained requirements growth and an
unbridled budget;
• A single strategy ready for application to all C(3)I system acquisition efforts;
• A checklist approach that will greatly simplify C(3)I acquisition; or
• A free ticket to exemption from competition, disciplined configuration
management, testing, or logistics support planning.
Evolutionary Acquisition poses additional challenges in these areas and
requires careful tradeoff analysis to reach smart decisions that will benefit the total
acquisition.
An Evolutionary Acquisition model and its application emphasize the
incremental nature of the Evolutionary Acquisition approach and the essential, continual
user involvement in every phase of development.
<L Thefollowing is a briefdescription ofthe Evolutionary
Acquisition process:
The Service Chief or representative begins the process with the definition
of the overall system operational concept and requirements, expressed in functional terms
and based upon user input. At about the same time, the operational concept and
functional requirements for the first system operational element to be fielded (the core
element) are also defined in considerable detail. When fielded, the core element must
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provide a significant, identifiable operational capability and be supportable in its intended
operational environment.
After the Service Chief (or representative) formulates an overall system
concept and identifies the overall capability required in the final configuration, the
developer recommends, for Service approval, a system architecture capable of
accommodating system evolution without redesign. The supporter identifies the
minimum elements required to sustain the system in its intended operational
environment. The system architecture is a critical element that should be structured with a
great deal of care and with some detail, although a high degree of specificity as to details
may be impossible at first.
Evolutionary Development Plan : The Evolutionary Development Plan is a
Service-approved and Service-funded product. Its goal is achievement of the overall
capability through incremental development, fielding, and support of incremental
upgrades to the core (or baseline) operational capability.
Architectural Plan : This plan is a description of the principles on which
the system architecture is based and the kind of changes that architecture can facilitate.
Technology Road Map. This is a schedule for the availability of
technology developments relating to the system under development. It should include a
survey of commercial, off-the-shelf products and a projected schedule for maturing
emerging technologies.
The Service Chief (or representative), with continuing developer,
supporter, and user input, defines the initial (core) capability to be developed, tested, and
fielded. It is important to note that the core element is not fielded until operationally
tested to determine its effectiveness, suitability, and sustainability. The fielded
incremental capability is then operated and exercised by the user and sustained by the
supporter in its operational environment. The user provides recommendations to be
addressed in the definition of later incremental upgrades.
On a sequential basis, the additional increments of capability are defined,
Service approved, developed, operationally evaluated, fielded, and supported in the same
way as the initial increment.
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Funding for the system elements is also incremental in nature. Budget
approval and funding for each element is made available only after the operational
performance characteristics and support requirements of that element have been defined
in sufficient detail for development of that element to begin.
In the interest of simplicity, the model does not present the contribution
that an off-line development, test, and support facility may make to the development
process. Such a facility, using operational mock-ups, simulations, and a software
laboratory, will generally be required for system development, development testing, and
system integration. The facility will also serve to help integrate the users' and testers'
input with that of the development activities and will provide the capability to develop
and evaluate hardware and software updates.
e. Areas Requiring Special Consideration When Using
Evolutionary Acquisition
While Evolutionary Acquisition could be the best approach to use in
acquiring certain weapon systems, it is, of course, no panacea. To formulate and execute
an Evolutionary Acquisition strategy successfully, a number of areas must be given
special consideration. Key areas requiring such consideration are discussed below:
Acquisition Executive, User, User Representative, Supporter, Independent
Tester, and Developer. In conventional acquisition programs, relationships among these
six entities may sometimes be rather formal, and negotiations among them may be
conducted at arm's length. For Evolutionary Acquisition to be successful, some of the
roles of these entities may need to be redefined, and most of the relationships need to be
closer and more cooperative than has been the norm.
System Operational Capabilities : In system acquisition, the user
representative frequently has the primary role in specifying the desired operational
requirements for the system. Depending upon Service-specific procedures, the actual user
may be rather far removed from this process. A major premise, when Evolutionary
Acquisition processes are used, is that the field user plays the major role in formulating
operational requirements and in defining detailed system characteristics. The traditional
roles of the user and the user representative may have to be redefined for a particular
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program, in accordance with the needs of that program. Each program will, therefore,
need to define suitable roles/relationships for all participants. The complexity of these
relationships is likely to be even greater in cases where the actual user is in a Service
different from that of the developer. A Memorandum of Understanding or Agreement is
recommended in these instances.
Operational Test and Evaluation : A key premise involved in using
Evolutionary Acquisition processes is that systems tests are made incrementally on each
element of system capability. Initial testing is accomplished on the first incremental
system configuration and involves an investigation of architecture growth capability.
Testing continues on subsequent configurations, as they become available. The tests
determine whether the system, as configured, meets the operational requirements
specified by the user.
Each Service has an organization responsible for independent operational
test and evaluation. When the user operates a system, that user becomes a critical part of
the total system and greatly influences its performance. When independent testers
perform tests with user forces, not only are test results more likely to represent real
capabilities; but both the user and the developer gain understanding of the system
capabilities. That shared information is critical to validating (or redefining) operational
requirements for those system increments that are to follow:
Operational tests : Operational tests are important in the process of
evolving requirements and introducing increments of system operating improvements. As
a result, it is imperative that operational testers and evaluators become deeply involved
early and maintain continuous, direct liaison with developer and user. Early, continuous
involvement facilitates the integrated, appropriate, and timely operational testing
essential to successful system development.
Test and Evaluation Planning : Use of Evolutionary Acquisition
approaches is likely to necessitate some redefinition of the process of operational testing
and evaluation. Specifically, there may be an increased use of contractor testing,
especially for systems that are software intensive; but contractor participation in the final
phase of operational testing prior to Milestone III (for example, Initial Operational Test
and Evaluation) is almost always entirely prohibited. The issue of contractor participation
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in operational testing must be addressed in the Test and Evaluation Master Plan at
program inception. The objective of operational test and evaluation should be to exploit
integrated testing without loss of critical independence of contractor/developer/user
perspective and their subsequent input to the ongoing development process.
Developer-User Interaction : In conventional acquisition processes,
developers and users may have less frequent interaction during the development process
than during Evolutionary Acquisition processes. Evolutionary Acquisition processes
depend on just such close and continued interaction. Developers, users, and those who
will support the system when deployed must work closely together over the course of the
development activity. For systems with requirement uncertainties, provision for user
prototypes and beta site testing should be included within the acquisition strategy.
Program Review and Approval : In conventional acquisition, there are
normally only a few times when the Program Manager needs to obtain approval of the
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) in order to proceed with the program. Such
approval is normally required at each of the major program milestones. Evolutionary
Acquisition processes might require Milestone Decision Authority approval for each
increment of capability, perhaps at each of several stages in the development program.
Under these circumstances, it would be necessary to greatly streamline the review and
approval process. For some programs, when a final configuration can be defined in some
detail, the total system might be validated as a single requirement and each increment
treated as a "release." This only pertains as long as the program remains within
designated performance and cost thresholds.
Program Management : For conventional programs, a program office is
frequently not established until Milestone I or later. Often the program office is not as
well staffed with experienced people during the early phases of a program as in later
program phases.
In using Evolutionary Acquisition, it is important that a capable program
office be established very early in the program because: (1) the acquisition strategy must
be defined early; (2) roles and relationships of the various key players in the acquisition
process (as discussed previously) need to be negotiated early; (3) the program sponsor
will need program office support in defining the fundamental architecture and support
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structure underlying the entire system; and (4) Evolutionary Acquisition requires early
delivery of a core capability and early feedback on its performance.
Another consideration involving the program office is that the office must
generally be staffed more heavily to allow it to manage all phases of the acquisition cycle
concurrently. This is necessary when using an Evolutionary Acquisition process because
several increments may be under development at any one time, and these various
increments may be at different stages of the acquisition cycle.
Competition in Contracting : Use of Evolutionary Acquisition requires
consideration of four closely related areas of work. These areas are: (1) system
architecture; (2) development and maintenance of the Off-line Development, Test, and
Support Facility; (3) system configuration management; and (4) logistics support. These
areas of work may continue not only throughout the Evolutionary Acquisition period, but
most likely throughout the acquisition process and the system's useful lifetime. This is
because the system will continue to evolve as it is used. Because it is important that
continuity be maintained in each of these functional areas, either the functions must be
provided directly by the Government; or any contractor performing a function must be
retained for a number of years. While contractors can be changed occasionally without
undue program impact, frequent change in responsible agent or staff will likely be highly
disruptive. In such cases it may be preferable for the Government to perform the
functions with in-house Government Staff.
On the other hand, normal practices concerning competition most likely
could be employed for the tasks of developing each of the increments of the system's
operational capability. Here, the inefficiencies of new contractors learning the system
may or may not offset the positive values of competition.
In keeping with the Evolutionary Acquisition approach, special emphasis
should be placed on early development of an acquisition plan to ensure that procurement
lead-time constraints are noted and addressed up front. The Evolutionary Acquisition
"fast march" will necessitate innovative contracting approaches; early planning would
afford maximum opportunity to make use of effective competition practices. For
example, a two-phase process might be used as shown below. The first phase would
involve multiple awards with the resulting contracts addressing the core capability of the
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system. Potential teaming arrangements would be indicated. Conceptual segments and
approaches to incremental upgrades would be discussed and a system specification
prepared. Demonstration models would be deliverables where feasible. The second phase
would involve selection of a contractor for a system engineering integration contract.
This would allow for competition at the second tier for individual increments. This
approach tends to be time-intensive up front but pays off with a smoother transition in the
second phase. In addition, it would provide much greater accountability and confidence
in the adequacy of the final system capability.
Control and Stability of the Development Process : Evolutionary
Acquisition processes must provide for proper process control. Although Evolutionary
Acquisition is by definition evolutionary, it is important that it be partitioned into fairly
distinct increments. These developmental increments must be precisely defined and
clearly identify the system performance they will achieve. Once the development of a
particular increment is well under way, changes in functional requirements pertaining to
that increment should be made only if they are very important. Feedback on effectiveness
and suitability from actual operations and maintenance is almost always required to
determine the value of proposed changes. Consideration should be given to the following
when managing change:
When programs have short time periods between development increments,
it might be best to defer requirement changes until the next program increment. This
preserves the acquisition schedule and does not place delivery and fielding plans at risk.
Preserving schedule is of little value, however, if feedback indicates an inability to meet
or sustain specified performance thresholds or a lack of logistic support.
When users can identify frequently changing requirements, evolutionary
acquisition may be an appropriate strategy if multiple configurations can be managed and
supported. Evolutionary processes provide for later stages when such changes can be
incorporated if still required.
The need to manage requirement changes is, perhaps, greatest when
change affects software in development. It is often possible to effect a performance
change through a change to the system software. There is a widely held belief that
software changes are easy to accomplish and that a change in requirement results in only
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minor software modification. In reality, the further along the development process, the
more difficult it is to make such changes. Detecting errors in program function caused by
modification to program code becomes much more difficult as individual software
programs are joined with each other through a series of integration tests. Experience
shows that lack of tight software configuration control produces extreme difficulty in
both testing and in-service use.
Configuration Management and Documentation of System Design. For
any acquisition program, configuration management and full documentation of the design
of the system are important. The technical data package is the key to disciplined
documentation. For an Evolutionary Acquisition program possibly involving both an
evolving architecture and a series of system increments, it is especially important that
configuration management and system documentation be comprehensive and of high
quality.
Production and Installation : In considering Evolutionary Acquisition of
defense systems, attention is normally focused primarily upon architecture, requirements,
development, integration, and evaluation.
Most of the issues concerning production and supportability of C(3)I
systems are not greatly different from the issues concerning production of the hardware
of many other types of systems. One notable difference in hardware installation,
however, is seated in the fact that many large C(3)I systems are few in number or even
unique. In such cases, however, the time between system evolutionary increments may be
shortened with only a small impact on configuration management and installation.
As opposed to hardware, the cost of producing and distributing software is
significantly less than its development costs. Once the development of software is
complete, production and distribution consist primarily of copying digital data from one
storage medium to another. Installation of software (exclusive of software integration and
test) is also generally a trivial process, involving primarily the reading of digital data
from a magnetic tape or disk into a computer's internal memory and testing to ensure the
program was installed correctly.
Software Maintenance and Control : Even though the term "maintenance"
is generally applied to both hardware and software, they are two radically different
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things. Maintenance of hardware consists largely of actions to: (1) determine whether the
hardware is functioning properly; (2) prevent components from wearing out; (3) correct
for deviations in system component functional characteristics (or "drift"); and (4) repair
or replace badly worn or failed components. Determinations of the need for maintenance
and the ease with which maintenance can be performed on hardware are dictated to a
large extent by its design and manufacture.
Conversely, software does not drift, wear out, burn out, or break and so
requires no maintenance of the kind required for hardware; but software does malfunction
when untested combinations of options are used. Since testing does not find all the bugs,
however, operational malfunctions do require software maintenance and support.
Software maintenance, as opposed to hardware maintenance, is concerned
with two quite different activities, which are: detecting, localizing, and analyzing
software bugs (design deficiencies remaining in the software) and then either correcting
the bugs by changing the design of the software or devising means to allow the system to
operate adequately in spite of the bugs; or changing the existing functional characteristics
of the system by modifying the design of the software, and adding additional functional
capability to the system by designing and adding additional software.
Because software maintenance activities result in functional performance
changes to the software, adequate configuration management procedures must be
observed in the maintenance process, and systems documentation (technical data
package) must be updated to reflect the program changes. This practice must be followed
for each software increment or phase that is released for use.
For C(3)I systems acquired by means of Evolutionary Acquisition, it
seems almost axiomatic that the above software functions must be performed by the
development rather than by the support community. Indeed, this is mandatory for the full
period of the acquisition if difficulty in operational test and evaluation is to be avoided.
Moreover, even after completion of the basic acquisition cycle, C(3)I systems are likely
to undergo subsequent incremental changes to meet changing operational conditions and
to incorporate significant new capabilities. Thus, it is likely that a software development
capability and the Off-line Development, Test, and Support Facility would be maintained
for the operational life of the C(3)I system.
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In view of the circumstances, the transition of software design, control,
production, and maintenance from the development community to the support
community should be treated on a case-by-case basis for each major C(3)I system. From
the very beginning, however, the developer must consider support alternatives in the
operational environment and either modify designs to increase supportability or plan for
the necessary support to be available. These tradeoffs should be assessed early in the
conceptual stage. This support alternative assessment should include consideration of
diagnostics/prognostics and design for discard while they are still feasible.
User Designed/Maintained Software : With the advent of low-cost
computers and easy-to-use, high-level software (such as database management systems),
it is to be expected that some users will wish to design and maintain their own individual
"micro" C(3)I systems. While a do-it-yourself microsystem might sometimes be
desirable, such a system can also be a source of difficulties as a result of: (1) possible
lack of integration of such a system within a larger C(3)I framework; (2) possible lack of
adequate system documentation; and (3) possible lack of adequate configuration
management.
The better the acquisition community can meet the user's needs in a timely
and adequate way, the less likely the users will be to act as their own system developers.
Product Assurance : Solid product assurance planning must link all
aspects/phases of the system and be visible at decision milestones. Such planning should
highlight the fact that, in an evolutionary approach, the developer's responsibility must
extend through user/fielded verification and may entail special maintenance or warranty
provisions.
Logistics Support : As with conventional acquisition approaches, logistics
support is critical in Evolutionary Acquisition to ensure that design is influenced by
support requirements and that support is available for operational sustainment. In the
C(3)I environment, supportability of the software and the equipment that operates the
software is critical to the supportability of the overall weapon system. [Ref 20]
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D. SUMMARY
Despite all of the studies and initiatives implemented through the Defense
Acquisition history, cost growth and schedule slips are still prevalent problems today. To
still have these problems, even after all of these initiatives and studies, there is
something missing in the big picture. With all these lessons-learned and technology
available on the eve of the 2
1
st
century, the DoD and its counterparts are not adapting





In this chapter, based on the survey conducted during thesis research, I will
address basic findings of the survey. These findings will be discussed in the following
"Analysis" chapter. In order to understand the challenges in the Defense Acquisition
System, a snapshot of the system is needed. The survey will provide the insight to the
"big picture" of the system. This insight will provide the basis to develop/propose better
organizations, regulations and sound Defense Acquisition System changes.
B. SURVEY METHODOLOGY
A survey questionnaire was developed and sent to DoD Acquisition personnel.
The set of questions was used to collect opinion data from military and civilian managers
in similar PM positions.
1. Population
The population receiving this survey was based on PM and Deputy PM positions
in the Defense Acquisition System. In order to obtain the other insights into Program
Management and organizational relationships at the PM level, Program Executive Office
(PEO) and functional line managers were also included in the survey.
Some relevant population demographics are presented:
• Rank: General five percent, 0-6 36 percent, 0-5 27 percent, GS-15 14
percent, GS-14 eight percent (See Figure 5*-l).
• Degree: MS/MA/MBA 92 percent, BS/BA eight percent (See Figure 5-2).
• Experience: 1-10 years 28 percent, 11-20 years 43 percent, 20+ years 12
percent (See Figure 5-3).
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1-10 years 11 -20 years 20+ years Unknown
Figure 5-3, Experience Distribution
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2. Survey Instrument
The survey instrument addressed five areas:
• Challenges in managing program;
• Challenges encountered in implementing Acquisition Reforms;
• Human Resources related challenges;
• Opinions about improving Defense Acquisition Management;
• The PM position in the current environment;
Additionally, some personal information such as rank, degree, position,
experience etc., was collected to assist in the analysis.






Question 1: I believe there is strong link between budget formulation and
execution.
Figure 5-4, Answer 1
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Question 2: I have enough award authority to incentivize both core and matrix
personnel.
Figure 5-5, Answer 2
Question 3: Best business practices will help speed up integration with contractor
teams and improve the experience.
Figure 5-6, Answer 3
Question 4: 1 am confident that I have the authority, manpower and tools to tailor
the phases and milestones to fit unique requirements ofmy program.
Figure 5-7, Answer 4
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Question 5: I have enough flexibility in the Acquisition Plan to solve problems I
encounter.
Figure 5-8, Answer 5
Question 6: 1 spent most ofmy time resolving conflicts or finding new sources to
keep my program stable which might be caused by. . ..











8. Lack of authority
9. Lack of information
10. Matrix vs. core organization
Callenges in managing the program
78% 69% 67%
50% 50% 41% 40%
31% 29% 22%
8 9 10
Figure 5-9, Answer 6
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follows:
Question 7: What do you think the barriers in acquisition reform/streamlining are?
Survey participants identified the barriers in acquisition reform/streamlining as
1
.
Resistance to change by personnel
2. Poor communication




Figure 5-10, Answer 7
Question 8: Becoming commercial-like in Acquisition will ease/facilitate the
relations with contractors/Congress/war fighting units so it will reduce cycle time and
cost.
Figure 5-11, Answer 8
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• 1 2 3 - 4
Figure 5-12, Answer 9
Question 10: Use of EDI/EC will help to establish more decentralized
management.
Figure 5-13, Answer 10
Question 11: The PM should waive or seek relief from low value added
directives.
Figure 5-14, Answer 11
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Question 12: For the PM, it is better to get involved in requirements generation
with users and to begin a dialogue with industry in requirements generation process early
on.
Figure 5-15, Answer 12
Question 13: To have the authority to resolve issues at the lowest possible










—12 3 4 5
Figure 5-16, Answer 13
Question 14: In order to reduce overall life cycle cost (not just acquisition cost of
the system), the PM needs to have better communication with users.
Figure 5-17. Answer 14
122
Question 15: Stable funding is the key element of cutting life cycle cost, so the
PM needs to have tools and authority to keep it.
Figure 5-18, Answer 15
Question 16: Being able to switch money within accounts (changing color of
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Figure 5-19, Answer 16
Question 17: I feel free to improve/make changes (E.G., human resources,
training, fund transfer etc. in my program, when I encounter/anticipate problems.
Figure 5-20, Answer 17
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Question 18: 1 get timely decisions by senior leadership.
Figure 5-21, Answer 18
Question 19: What are the most significant five-problems in your program (it may
be in previous programs you worked)?
The most frequently expressed problems reported by survey respondents:
• Resource allocation
• Funding
•S Lack of funding
S Unstable funding
S Different accounts (color of money)




S Lack of incentive/promotion possibilities
• Organizational/Leadership
S Inconsistency or lack of commitment in upper management level
S Micro management





Question 20: Are you comfortable to take risk in your program, if not why?
Answer 20: Eighty-four percent of the participants were comfortable in risk
taking in their program. But it is noteworthy that 60 percent of them believe that they are
exceptional and they rely on either their experience (more than two third of the
participants have more than ten years experience) or their personal relationships to
address program challenges
Question 21: Do you consider yourself candid and forthcoming without fear of
personal consequences?
Answer 21 : Eighty-two percent of the participants consider themselves candid and
forthcoming, without fear of personal consequences.
Question 22: Do you think your authority is commensurate with your responsibility?
Sixty percent of the participants said that their authority was commensurate with their
responsibility. The remaining 40 percent indicated that they do not have enough latitude
to practice their own judgement.
Question 23 : Do you have the freedom to see senior leadership/legislator? If not,
please explain what your problems are.
Answer 23: Fifty-six percent of the participants responded that they had sufficient
access to senior leadership.
Question 24: Do you think giving more decision making power and
communication tools to interact with other players of acquisition management will
reduce/eliminate non-value- added steps in Defense Acquisition Management? .
Anwer 24: Sixty-eight percent of the survey participants indicated that they more
decision making power and communication tools would be better.
D. SUMMARY
Challenges in the Defense Acquisition Management still exist in different areas
such as funding, manpower, leadership, communication, and teaming. Besides all these
challenges, people in the Acquisition Workforce are working hard to improve the system.
Most are candid in taking risk and ready to do everything possible to make the system
better, faster, and cheaper. They realized the importance of the teaming and better
communication with industry, and user. They have the power to tailor the system for
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Based on the survey conducted and background information given in the
preceding chapters, this chapter will address the relationships of the responses of the
survey on the current Defense Acquisition System and its challenges. Since the system is
intricate and survey responses are subjective, sometimes there are contradictory opinions
on the same issue or different approaches to improve the system. However, there is a high
level of awareness of the challenges and the need to change.
B. ACQUISITION REFORMS
Over the last decade, many improvements have been implemented in the Defense
Acquisition System. Some have been extremely effective and others less effective; but
the dynamic internal/external environment and a desire to be perfect lead to continuous
change.
On February 9, 1994, the Secretary of Defense William Perry described the
overriding world environment that will drive future Defense Acquisition:
Time poses a new set of political, economic, and military security
challenges for the United States: regional or limited conflicts; proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, both nuclear and non-nuclear; risk to its
economic well-being; and the possible failure of democratic reform in the
former Soviet Bloc and elsewhere.
Today, according to the survey conducted during this thesis research, challenges
in managing the program include:
• Funding
•S Lack of funding
S Unstable funding
S Different accounts (color of money)




S Lack of incentive/promotion possibilities
• Organizational/Leadership
S Inconsistency or lack of commitment in upper management level
S Micro management




These challenges are quite similar to the ones stated by Mr. Perry, and his
successor Mr. Cohen in various reports including Mandate for Change and QDR
testimony in front of the Congress. This similarity shows us that we still need to work on
these challenges.
A major challenge to maintaining technical superiority and a strong national
industrial base, the procurement budget has declined more than 60 percent in real terms
since FY85. DoD and the Nation can no longer afford the luxury of maintaining a totally
unique defense industrial base, and there is need to reduce acquisition cost significantly.
In order to improve efficiency and effectiveness, some major Acquisition
Reforms were implemented in the last few years such as FASA, FARA, FACNET,
EC/EDI, EA etc. Unfortunately, expected outcomes have not been achieved. In the
survey, participants expressed challenges they encountered while implementing these
reforms:
• Resistance to change by personnel
• Poor communication




EC/EDI was one of the most popular reforms which is still underway. More than
half of the survey participants (5 1 percent) agree that the use of EC/EDI would help to
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improve the system.
Another aspect of acquisition reform is managing programs by using commercial
business practices. It is also acknowledged that one-to-one transformation from
commercial business to DoD business is not appropriate. However, there are many
functions which can be adapted to commercial business practices. Sixty-four percent of
the survey participants approved of the use of best business practices to speed up the
required integration with contractor teams and improve the experience. Civilian/military
industrial integration was emphasized by Dr. Jacques S. Gansler.
We seek a greatly expanded partnership with revived and prospering
commercial industry .... Using commercial business practices over the
past five years, the DLA wholesale inventory alone was reduced $721
million, a 30-percent savings. This shows the dramatic savings that can
result when we adapt commercial practices to our military requirement.
These practices must become widespread!
Increasing communication with all players and empowering the acquisition
personnel with enough authority to make changes needed were widely accepted (88
percent and 95 percent accordingly) by the survey participants. After these Acquisition
Reform initiatives 60 percent of the participants said that their authority was
commensurate with their responsibility. Fifty-six percent of survey participants
responded that they had sufficient access to senior leadership.
The IPT approach was implemented widely in DoD. IPT guidelines were not
intended in any way to detract from the responsibility and authority of the PM which is
established in the PM's Bill of Rights. The IPT activities were designed to assist the PM
by engaging OSD and the Service Staff in early and continuous support and by
identifying and resolving issues as early as possible. As expressed in the survey findings,
there is a great demand for teaming. However there are problems encountered by
participants in implementing teaming concepts. This shows that the IPT approach was
well chosen by DoD officials, but still needs to be improved to ensure it is implemented
properly.
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It is clear that significant challenges remain and there is room to improve the
system, while there is resistance to change to all these efforts. "This reform must continue
to spread to all areas and become part of the way every one does business... [Ref 21]."
Acquisition Reform is a program to achieve DoD's military superiority
objective at reduced price with increased responsiveness to the customers.
Key elements of the strategy are to integrate the military and commercial
industrial base, increase innovation, foster managed risk, encourage
empowerment and establish cross-functional revisions to law and policies
and change the culture of the current acquisition environment to give
program managers the freedom to succeed. [Ref 22]
C. ACQUISITION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
1. Requirements Generation
Requirements Generation is the key in the Defense Acquisition Management
Process. According to survey participants, there are challenges directly and indirectly
related with this key part of the system. Ninety-five percent of the survey participants
agree that it is better for the PM to get involved in the requirements generation process
with users and to begin a dialogue with industry early on.
Once requirements are validated and approved, the effects of any mistake done at
this stage will cost time and money later on in the program. As it is important in the other
phases of the program, communication is important in the requirements generation
process. Communication barriers were identified by 50 percent of the survey participants.
Eighty eight percent of the participants also indicated that, in order to reduce overall life
cycle cost, the PM needs to have better communication with users.
In the Requirements Generation Process, according to the survey responses, the
PM should seek relief from low value-added directives. In the case of requirements
conflict, 85 percent of the survey participants believe that having authority to resolve
issues at the lowest possible management level would save time and money.
An analysis of the survey responses indicated that PMs still have challenges in
Requirement Generation Process. They want:
• Better communication to understand user/industry perspective
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• Authority to resolve issues at the lowest possible level, and
• Relief from low value-added steps
in the Requirements Generation Process. This shows that using the IPT approach will
decrease challenges and reduce the cycle time and save money.
2. Resource Allocation Process
The Resource Allocation Process is an integral part of the Defense Acquisition
System which affects the program stability most. Hence, the cycle time and cost of the
programs depend on the success of synchronizing the two processes.
In the survey, 78 percent of the respondents had issues related to RAP as the
major challenge to effective and efficient Acquisition Management. In question 19,
participants decomposed funding problems as:
• Lack of funding
• Unstable funding
• Inflexibility of funding (different accounts, color of money)
In response to question 15, 88 percent of survey respondents said "stable funding
was the key element of cutting life cycle cost." The reason for instability of funding
stems from the Resource Allocation Process. As explained in Chapter III, Defense
Acquisition Management and PPBS are independent processes.
Difficulty begins with the Enactment Phase of the RAP. Even though DoD has
submitted a two-year budget to the Congress every year since January 1987, the Congress
authorizes most programs and funding on an annual bases. In addition to that, even
multiyear procurements are funded by annual appropriations.
The second part of the funding problem is lack of funding. It stems from 1) PPBS
process mismatch with life cycle management (i.e., It is possible for a program to be
approved to enter the next phase but have insufficient funds to execute the phase.) 2)
Unexpected program budget cuts by DoD or the Congress caused by changing program
priorities in DoD or other budgetary shortfalls.
The third part of the funding problem is the flexibility of funding also known as
"color of money." Different accounts are used to execute the different phases of the
program. However, these pre-approved accounts do not always fit flexible program
131
execution. In this case, having money in one account does not help to solve "lack of
funding" in another account. In order to eliminate/decrease effects of this challenge, 80
percent of the survey participants agree that being able to switch money within accounts
(changing color of money at the PM level) would improve the program stability. In this
context, while 62 percent of the survey participants feel free to improve/make changes on
funding transfers, 25 percent of the participants do not feel free. (Remaining 13 percent
had no preference).
Funding instability affects the schedule, unit cost, and life cycle cost of the
program. It is acceptable to make choices among programs and sometimes kill any of
them, but overall and continuous funding instability significantly distracts the PM and
his/her office from concentrating on the other challenges of the program.
The most practical thing for the PM in the current system is to pay close attention
to avoid a mismatch or disconnect between programmatic requirements and available
funding. For future programs, it is better to:
• Improve cost estimation of the programs,
• Have sufficient PM reserve,
• Give authority to the PM to change the color of the money when necessary,
• Keep core requirements stable as much as necessary to decrease needs for
extra funding,
• Keep procurement budget from unexpected cuts, and
• Define program priorities up front.
3. Program Management
Program Management is not effective and efficient enough. According to the
PM's Bill of Rights, the PM has authority to tailor his/her program in addition to
responsibilities mentioned there. With the four-tier system, life cycle management
process, PPBS, it seems like Program Management works well under the PM's control.












Matrix vs. core organization
Despite all these challenges, 84 percent of the acquisition managers are willing to
take risks and 82 percent of them are candid and forthcoming without fear of personal
consequences while making decisions.
The authority granted to the PM is not enough according to survey findings. For
example:
• Thirty percent of the survey participants are not happy with award authority to
incentivize both core and matrix personnel.
• Forty-five percent of the participants are not confident that they have the
authority to tailor the phases and milestones to fit the unique requirements of
their program.
In order to improve the Defense Acquisition Management, 95 percent of the
survey participants believe that having the authority to resolve the issues at the lowest
possible management level is essential. Eighty-seven percent emphasized that the PM
needs to have tools and authority to keep funding stable ~ the key element of cutting life
cycle cost. As a means to stabilize program funding, 80 percent of the respondents
propose having the authority to switch money within accounts.
Besides all the desire for decision making power and authority, the level of
legitimate authority granted in PM's Bill of Rights was supported by 60 percent of the
survey participants. The remaining 40 percent indicated that they did not have enough
latitude to practice their own judgement.
As it is mentioned in the IPT approach, timely decisions and better
communication will save time and money. This view was shared by most of the
participants in response to different questions in the survey. For instance, 95 percent of
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the survey participants expressed the opinion that for PMs, it is better to get involved in
the Requirements Generation Process with users and to begin dialogue with industry
while 87 percent agreed that a better communication with users to reduce life cycle cost.
One solution to improve the communication with other players is to increase EDI/EC.
Only three percent of the participants disagreed with the use of EDI/EC.
In the organization of the Defense Acquisition Management, roles and
responsibilities are defined for major players in detail, such as the DAE, CAE, PEO, and
PM. But in a managing program, especially after downsizing and the implementation of a
matrix organization, problems arose in managing people. In response to question six, 40
percent of the Acquisition Managers identified "Ambiguous roles" as one of the major
challenges. Twenty-two percent had problems with matrix organization structure.
Side effects of downsizing were also identified as affecting the roles of personnel
in Defense Acquisition Management. Managers must to consolidate jobs so that
personnel are doing more than before downsizing. It becomes important while trying to
eliminate unnecessary positions and save money while insuring personnel are not
overloaded.
In the chain of command, 56 percent of the survey respondents said that they had
access to senior leadership. Some of the participants made comments on this issue stating
that they did not think that they needed to see senior leadership. Since there is not
detailed information, it is difficult to reach a conclusion regarding senior level access.
One of the PEOs' comments about access to senior leadership/legislator was noteworthy,
".
. .you need to have credibility with both sides."
To improve roles and organizational structure, we need to pay attention to:
• Rightsizing
• Empowerment of the right people
• Clarifying the roles and responsibilities
• Better and candid horizontal/vertical communication
The inevitable challenges for Defense Acquisition Management are scarce
resources (i.e. declining budget, manpower etc.), rapidly changing environments (i.e.
threats, requirements, technological innovations etc.), and difficulty in translating user
needs into applicable, sound performance specifications.
134
Inconsistent goals was identified as a challenge in managing a program by 50
percent of the survey respondents. Referring to policy and procedures, 69 percent of the
participants said "they had difficulty understanding and following "program
priorities/schedules .
"
Based on survey responses, there are many challenges in managing programs and
efforts to improve the Defense Acquisition Management Process. But, as it was
mentioned in Chapter IV and in the beginning of this chapter, one of the major challenges
is barriers to change.
This challenge can be improved by having a policy which allows for a loose
organization with good communication channels and empowered people to utilize scarce
resources effectively and efficiently. Otherwise, every policy has to be renewed
according to ever-changing environments and needs.
D. SUMMARY
Since the Packard Commission, the Defense Acquisition System has been
improved in terms of organization, RAP, Requirement Generation Process, and Defense
Acquisition Management. In spite of all the acquisition reforms to date, PMs still face
emerging challenges due to the ever-changing external and internal environment.
Accordingly, from the responses to the survey, more changes are necessary to improve
the system in response to the changing environment.
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The Defense Acquisition System is the biggest enterprise in the history, including
three main players in it; the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch, and the Industry.
With different motives and objectives, each branch is serving the U.S. defense efforts at
different levels and areas.
The main driver of the Defense Acquisition System is the threat against the U.S.
and her allies. One of the difficulties in accomplishing this mission is the uncertainty of
the threat which leads to different combinations of the weapon system requirements. By
making an assessment every four years (Quadrennial Defense Review), this uncertainty is
decreased to some extent.
DoD has established an organizational structure to deal with Weapon Systems
Acquisition. It consists of four levels under the Secretary of Defense headed by the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) (USD(A&T)). At the bottom of this
command chain, the Program Manager (PM) is ultimately responsible for the program.
Program Management starts with a Mission Need Statement (MNS) and goes through
milestones and phases based on program needs and ends with disposal of the system.
During the Program Management, there are problems affecting the program
adversely in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. These problems vary from funding
instability to human resource related issues.
It is hard to assess the success of any single program's management, which makes
reforms hard to propose and implement. An objective judgement of the program is the
key factor to get support and keep moving with stable funding.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The changing world environment drives corresponding changes in how, and what
is produced by the U.S. Defense Acquisition System. The world's threat has radically
shifted from largely bi-polar "cold war" to the numerous fractured zones and terrorist
activities that destabilize the global environment. In addition, U.S. military forces are
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now participating in many non-traditional roles including peace keeping operations,
nation building, and anti-drug enforcement. In order to address the continually changing
threats and world situation, the U.S. conducts a formal assessment at least every four
years (the QDR).
This changing world situation creates a political environment where defensive
capabilities are de-emphasized, as perceived threats to U.S. Security are deemed not
extreme. Both the size of the force and the defense budget have been, and continue to be
decreased, even through forward zones required a presence. Unless the Congress
provides additional funding for planned contingencies, the military must find them
internally, drawing funding disproportionately from procurement accounts. All of these
factors place extreme pressure on the Defense Acquisition System.
The Defense Acquisition System is challenged to equip the force to meet the
decidedly different world situation. Reduced buying clout has shifted technology
development from military markets to commercial markets. In addition, many key
technology advancements have accelerated so that traditional acquisition cycle times
ensure deployment of outdated systems. The Defense Acquisition System must adapt so
that the U.S. military dominance is not compromised.
1. Acquisition Reforms
Recognizing the need for change, DoD instituted numerous acquisition reforms.
Theses reforms have had varying degrees of effectiveness, moving DoD toward a more
efficient Acquisition System. While representing a. good start, these reforms have not
moved the Defense acquisition System to the degree needed.
2. Acquisition Support Systems
a. Requirements Generation
Unconstrained and uncoordinated requirements generation has resulted in
a sub-optimized Defense Acquisition System. Cost as an independent variable has not
eliminated high cost, low-value-added requirements. Effective communication and
cooperation between combat developer and material developer remains elusive even with
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the IPPD approach. The high cost of a few high priority programs has reduced funds
available, or caused the cancellation of other important programs.
b. Resource Allocation
The rigid controls placed on all resources by the U.S. Congress are not
likely to change, despite the fact that resource allocation remains one of the most
significant barriers to effective and efficient acquisition. Considerable effort will continue
to be expended managing both personnel and funding resources, detracting from the
primary function of managing the program.
c. Program Management
Program management challenges will continue to increase. While
Acquisition Reforms have improved the process, difficulties in managing both the
Resource Allocation Process and the Requirements Generation Process have not been
adequately addressed. An inordinate amount of effort will continue to be expended
defending budgets, managing support personnel, and disputing high cost, low-value-
added requirements.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the Defense Acquisition System review, survey analysis, and
conclusions reached as a result thereof, the following actions need to be taken to improve
the Defense Acquisition System:
1. Acquisition Reforms
Acquisition Reforms should be closely studied before being implemented so that
there will be solutions to the current and prospective problems without interfering with
the other reforms and regulations. To avoid the implementation of conflicting new
aproaches, all players in the Acquisition System, both Government and industry should
be invited to participate in the formation of new policies and procedures. This would
minimize the barriers to the changes.
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2. Acquisition Support Systems
a. Requirements Generation
Good and effective communications should be increased between combat
developer and material developer. IPT and IPPD approaches should be expended at every
level of the Defense Acquisition System.
b. Resource Allocation
As a long-term commitment, rigid rules should be eliminated in the
Resource Allocation Process to eliminate low-value-added steps from the Defense
Acquisition System. For the short term, DoD should give flexibility in the allocation of
funding to Program Managers to increase the stability of their programs. Program
Managers should be freed from spending inordinate amounts of their time and effort
seeking additional funding or defending their program to retain current funding or to gain
additional funding.
c. Program Management
Effective communication between the user, industry, and the Congress
needs to be established upfront. PMs should be given more authority in making decisions
concerning their programs to manage their programs more efficiently and effectively.
Program Management offices should be equipped with enough personnel and tools to
handle the vast number of challenges confronting them.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What is the Defense Acquisition System and its problems from
Program Managers point of view?
The Defense Acquisition System is formed by three main players: the Legislative
Branch, the Executive Branch, and Industry. DoD has established an organizational
structure to deal with Weapon Systems Acquisition. It consists of four levels:
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• The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) (USD(A&T))
as Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE)
• Component Acquisition Executive (CAE)
• Program Executive Officer (PEO)
• Program Manager (PM).
At the bottom of this command chain, the Program Manager (PM) is the ultimate
person responsible for the program. Program Management starts with a Mission Need
Statement (MNS) and goes through milestones and phases based on program needs and
ends with disposal of the system.
The effective interaction of Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS),
Requirements Generation, and Acquisition Management is essential for the success.
Problems of the Defense Acquisition System from PM's point of view are as
follows:
Unstable and/or lack of funding
Lack of communication and teaming





Program priorities and schedule
2. What is the relationship between the Resource Allocation Process
(RAP) and National Security objectives?
The main driver of the Defense Acquisition System is the threat to the U.S. and
her allies. According to threat assessment, strategies are defined to encounter the possible
threat. Based on Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 1997, the Secretary of Defense
William Cohen stated that "shape-respond-prepare" is the key aspect of the strategy. In
this manner, in order to shape the world, instead of being reactive, which is more
expensive and sometimes ineffective, there is a need to be ahead of all other countries in
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terms of technology and military power. This requirement emphasizes the Defense
Acquisition.
Another aspect of the National Security is the lack of a certain enemy to be
prepared. Because of rapidly changing threats, program needs to have short cycle times
with lower budgets. Effectiveness and efficiency are both important in this situation
unlike war or crisis time. Also the lack of a particular enemy makes it hard to get the
Congress increase the defense budget.
3. What are the improvement efforts on the Defense Acquisition
System?
The Defense Acquisition System has been the topic of dissatisfaction for decades.
Making the system better, faster, and cheaper is the main idea behind all the reform
efforts. Beginning with the Rockefeller Report in 1953, the Blue Ribbon Report of 1970,
the Packard Commission Report, FASA 1994, and FARA 1996 are the major ones in the
history of the Defense Acquisition System.
By establishing ground rules like the four-tier system, life cycle management, and
the Planning Programming Budgeting System as a major part of the Resource Allocation
Process, the Defense Acquisition System has reached its contemporary form. The DoD
5000 series which is the guidance of the Defense Acquisition System was revised in
March 1996.
Lately, by Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and the National
Performance Review (NPR), the current administration has been working on measuring
effectiveness and efficiency of the system, focusing on the ability to track the outcomes
of the efforts and eliminate non-value-added steps in the system.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. Stable/Adequate Funding
Many problems in managing programs are caused by unstable or lack of funding.
Investigate the cost and schedule effects of these funding problems on the program.
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Examine the Cycle Time and Total Ownership Cost of the systems with and without
funding escalations.
2. Human Resource
Research the optimum number of personnel for different size programs to
accomplish the job. Determine education, training, and other skills needed by personnel
according to their position/function in the Program Office.
3. Evaluation Criteria
Develop a set criteria to evaluate the success of the program. This effort should be
objective enough to be accepted by all interested parties.
4. Common Board/Body of the Stake Holders
Examine the possibility of having a board or integrated team consisting of all
players of the Defense Acquisition System. This study should consider the power balance
of the stake holders and their influence on the system.
5. Resistance to change
Examine the root cause of the resistance to change in the Acquisition Community.
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